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ABSTRACT
When organizations act in ways that offend the public interest,
parties seeking to change that behavior traditionally turned to litigation
to force these organizations to reform, whether by command or
consent. For example, following Brown v. Board of Education,
“structural reform litigation” forced large-scale organizations, from
school boards to prisons, to change their practices. Similarly, federal
prosecutors have used agreements with large corporations to introduce
significant structural reforms.
This Article identifies an alternative strategy for organizational
change that relies on the indirect reputational effects of litigation. Under
this approach, organizational change does not result from court order
or parties’ settlement but from the informational effects of litigation:
litigation transmits information about an organization into the public
space; this information has reputational consequences for the affected
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organizations; voluntary organizational change is a response to that
reputational shaming. Critically, these reputational sanctions can
accompany all types of litigation and not just those specifically seeking
structural reform remedies.
This Article identifies and explains the operation of four
reputational sanctions: financial, policy, regulatory spillover, and
barriers to entry. We are most familiar with the financial sanction,
where consumers adopt “naming and shaming” boycotts to punish
corporations for their behavior, thereby encouraging the latter to
change their practices. But reputational sanctions also take the other
three forms and can encourage large organizations to change their
practices even when financial sanctions are weak or inoperative.
Collectively, these reputational sanctions—operating outside the
boundaries of traditional legal and regulatory processes—are
employed by both public and private actors and play an increasing role
in the decisions that organizations make.
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INTRODUCTION
Our daily lives are influenced by the conduct of organizations:
political committees, professional associations, labor unions,
multinational corporations, religious entities, financial institutions, and
healthcare providers, to name a few. When these organizations behave
badly, our traditional recourse is litigation.1 Since Brown v. Board of
Education,2 litigants have used “structural reform” lawsuits to force
school boards,3 prisons,4 police departments,5 and other public
organizations to change for the better.
But it is not only public organizations that can pose a threat to
society. Media headlines are filled with stories of misconduct by private
organizations: Whole Foods profits from slave labor;6 Google sells
1. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1282–83 (1979); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term – Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1979).
2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 869–70 (2007).
4. Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in
Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 848–60 (1990).
5. Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99 MINN.
L. REV. 1343, 1378–96 (2015).
6. Adam Chandler, Walmart, Whole Foods, and Slave-Labor Shrimp, ATLANTIC (Dec. 16,
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users’ data;7 the National Football League (NFL) hides the effects of
head trauma;8 Wells Fargo creates “fake accounts.”9 While “structural
reform prosecution” has been used to change private organizations,
this Article identifies an alternative strategy that relies on the
informational effects of litigation. As this Article explains, litigation
releases information about organizational conduct into the public
domain. This information has reputational consequences for the
affected organizations. Organizational change is a response to that
reputational shaming.10
Under this approach, organizational change does not result from
a court order or parties’ settlement. The engine for change is
reputation, and the fuel for that engine is information. Over the past
few years, for example, the NFL has faced a series of lawsuits from
injured players who claimed that the NFL knew about the dangers of
head injuries but hid those risks and failed to mitigate those risks.11 As
attention to head injuries from the media, athletes, and fans grew, the
NFL introduced a series of new protocols to prevent and better
understand head injuries, culminating in 2016’s $100 million initiative
“Play Smart, Play Safe.”12 Under this initiative, the NFL has committed
2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/12/slave-labor-shrimp-thailandwalmart-whole-foods/420837/ [https://perma.cc/QL33-MHT7].
7. Mark Hachman, The Price of Free: How Apple, Facebook, Microsoft and Google Sell
You to Advertisers, PCWORLD (Oct. 1, 2015, 3:00 AM), https://www.pcworld.com/article/2986988/
privacy/the-price-of-free-how-apple-facebook-microsoft-and-google-sell-you-to-advertisers.html
[https://perma.cc/P43B-YV5H].
8. Jim Avila, Enjoli Francis & Lauren Pearle, Former NFL Players File Lawsuit Against
League on Concussions, ABC NEWS (June 7, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/nfl-players-filelawsuit-league-concussions/story?id=16514359 [https://perma.cc/7ZWM-PT36].
9. Matt Egan, 5,300 Wells Fargo Employees Fired over 2 Million Phony Accounts, CNN
MONEY (Sept. 9, 2016, 8:08 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/09/08/investing/wells-fargo-createdphony-accounts-bank-fees [https://perma.cc/5V94-TH9Y].
10. Reputational shaming through litigation can also be used against public organizations.
See, e.g., Emily Chiang, Institutional Reform Shaming, 120 PENN ST. L. REV. 53, 76 (2015)
(“[R]eform shaming seeks to induce those who operate institutions like schools and prisons to
comply with the law for fear of being shamed if they do not.”). However, the focus of this Article
is the use of reputational sanctions against private organizations.
11. See Plaintiff’s Amended Master Administrative Long-Form Complaint at 4, In re Nat’l
Football Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2016) (No. 2:12-md-02323-AB)
(“The NFL . . . was aware of the evidence and the risks associated with repetitive traumatic brain
injuries virtually at the inception, but deliberately ignored and actively concealed the information
from the Plaintiffs and all others who participated in organized football at all levels.”).
12. Roger Goodell, NFL Commitment to Player Health and Safety: A Letter from
Commissioner Roger Goodell (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.playsmartplaysafe.com/commitmentletter [https://perma.cc/8JW3-3JYR] [hereinafter Goodell Letter]; see also Press Release,
National Football League, NFL, NFLPA Announce Policy to Enforce Concussion Protocol (July
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to additional medical research and dissemination of that research13 and
has changed officiating rules, practice guidelines, and training
methods, among other commitments and improvements.14
Reputational effects are not unique to litigation, but also apply to
other adjudicative processes, such as agency proceedings;
organizational change can follow from the reputational effects of all
these adjudicative processes.15 For example, Wells Fargo angered
many of its banking customers when it was revealed in September 2016
that Wells Fargo’s employees had “secretly created millions of
unauthorized bank and credit card accounts—without their customers
knowing it—since 2011.”16 The Consumer Financial Protection Board
(CFPB) fined Wells Fargo $100 million plus penalties for its sales
practices, but that figure is only a fraction of the loss that Wells Fargo
suffered because of its tainted reputation.17 One study found that, as
consumers switch to other banks in the wake of the scandal, Wells
Fargo could lose almost $100 billion in deposits plus another $4 billion
in revenue over the next two years.18 Additionally, this scandal affects
more than just Wells Fargo’s reputation; it also affects the reputation
of the broader banking industry, which has been attempting to regain
25, 2016), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000676669/article/nfl-nflpa-announce-policyto-enforce-concussion-protocol [https://perma.cc/7YAS-98WS] (“Furthering their commitment
to protecting the health and safety of NFL players, the NFL and NFLPA today announced an
agreement to enforce the NFL Game Day Concussion Protocol and discipline clubs that violate
it.”).
13. Goodell Letter, supra note 12 ( “Our primary interest is in keeping our players and the
public informed about these important health issues. As we gain new insights or discover new
challenges, we will share them, so you will know them as well.”).
14. Id.
15. See Nathan Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the Internet Era,
BYU L. REV. 1371, 1379 (2011) (discussing agency use of adverse publicity to compensate for
limited statutory enforcement authority); Ernest Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative
Agencies, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1380, 1381 (1973) (examining the risks of “adverse agency publicity,”
which are “affirmative measures taken by an agency which, by calling public attention to agency
action, may adversely affect persons identified in the publicity.”); Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60
DUKE L.J. 1841, 1851 (2011) (defending the use of informational threats by agencies in dynamic
industries). For further discussion on the informational effects of complaints filed under the
Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development (OECD), see infra Part V.D.
16. Egan, supra note 9.
17. Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Fines Wells Fargo $100 Million for Widespread Illegal Practice of Secretly Opening Unauthorized
Accounts (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumerfinancial-protection-bureau-fines-wells-fargo-100-million-widespread-illegal-practice-secretlyopening-unauthorized-accounts [https://perma.cc/UFJ9-KX2B].
18. CG42, WELLS FARGO MINI-STUDY 3 (2016), http://cg42.com/wp-content/uploads/
2016/12/cg42-Wells-Fargo-Mini-Study-102016vF.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CH9-85LJ] .
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public confidence since the financial crisis of 2008.19 To satisfy the
public demand for accountability and appease consumers and
policymakers, other banks are now considering changing their
practices on recovery of executive compensation.20
A number of scholars have explored the unique informationforcing effects of litigation for litigants,21 judges,22 and the broader
public.23 For a number of reasons, organizational actors possess

19. Evan Ramstad, U.S. Bancorp’s Richard Davis Says Banks Are Still Fighting for Their
Reputation, STAR TRIB. (Oct. 19, 2016, 9:09 PM), http://www.startribune.com/u-s-bancorp-profitcontinues-steady-march/397576481/ [https://perma.cc/3HWS-6MUK].
20. The compensation changes concern the recovery of executive compensation through
clawback policies that allow issuers to recover compensation from executives under certain
conditions. Many companies had already adopted some form of a clawback policy prior to the
Wells Fargo scandal. Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Item 402 of Regulation S-K
require reporting and clawback provisions for certain executives. Listing Standards for Recovery
of Erroneously Awarded Compensation, 80 Fed. Reg. 41,144, 41,145–46 (proposed July 14, 2015)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249, 274). Additionally, as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, the Securities & Exchange Commission
(SEC) proposed Rule 10D-1 in July 2015. Press Release, U.S. SEC, SEC Proposes Rules
Requiring Companies to Adopt Clawback Policies on Executive Compensation (July 1, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-136.html
[https://perma.cc/3QT7-6KSK].
The
proposed rule would require national securities exchanges to adopt listing standards that would
require issuers to adopt, disclose, and comply with clawback policies, which must meet certain
specified criteria. Listing Standards for Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Compensation, supra,
at 41,146. Against this backdrop, “[b]ankers fear not only that the new rules on pay will be
tightened as a result of the furor at Wells Fargo but also that boards will go beyond them to avoid
a political backlash.” Olivia Oran & Ross Kerber, Wells Fargo’s CEO Pay Clawback Puts Wall
Street Executives on Notice, REUTERS (Sept. 28, 2016, 6:59 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-wells-fargo-accounts-clawbacks-idUSKCN11Y358 [https://perma.cc/D74H-EZ3N].
21. Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the Judge in
Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (2017) (proposing that judges in
multidistrict litigation (MDL) cases use their role to force information disclosure, enabling parties
in MDL cases to reach informed decisions on whether or not to accept proposed settlements).
Hadfield and Ryan explain:
The power that parties wield when they become the abstract persons ‘Plaintiff’ and
‘Defendant’ in civil court, then, is a rather extraordinary capacity to call on the power
of the state to enforce obligations to disclose information. Outside of the courtroom
and the relationship of Plaintiff and Defendant there is no such power: a person who
has a grievance against another has only the tools that fall to his or her individual status
to obtain information.
Gillian K. Hadfield & Dan Ryan, Democracy, Courts and the Information Order, 54 EUR. J. SOC.
67, 81 (2013).
22. Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey Miller, An Information-Forcing Approach to the Motion
to Dismiss, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 437, 450 (2013) (proposing limited discovery at motion to
dismiss stage).
23. Alexandra D. Lahav, The Roles of Litigation in American Democracy, 65 EMORY L.J.
1657, 1683–90 (2016) (discussing transparency benefits for the public); Roy Shapira, Reputation
Through Litigation: How the Legal System Shapes Behavior by Producing Information, 91 WASH.
L. REV. 1193, 1213 (2016) (discussing second-opinion effects of the courts).
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information about their practices that are unknown to anyone else, but
it is often not in their interest to share it. Litigation forces that
information into the public.
This Article explores the related but distinct informationtransmission function of litigation: litigation as a mechanism to
disseminate information in society at large. While the two functions—
information forcing and information transmission—often overlap and
operate in tandem, the information-transmission function is distinct in
a few ways. First, it does not concern the revelation of new information,
but the dissemination and amplification of information that may
already be publicly available. The information-transmission function is
significant because availability does not equal attention: we often
ignore or otherwise miss information to which we have access.
Litigation brings it to our attention, often with the aid of the media,
which frames it within compelling narratives and elevates its profile,
thereby expanding the audience for it.24
Second, because the information-transmission function is not as
concerned with new information, it operates even if the parties do not
reach the discovery stage, where information-forcing functions are
exercised. The information-transmission function takes effect earlier,
even at the filing of the initial complaint.25 Measures that restrict
information-forcing functions of litigation may therefore not similarly
impede the information-transmission functions. However, measures
that restrict the flow of information from the courts to the public, such
as confidentiality measures or alternative dispute resolution, would
impede the transmission function.26
Finally, the information-transmission function helps to produce a
range of reputational sanctions. This Article describes four distinct
reputational sanctions produced by litigation or government

24. See Katerina Linos & Kimberly Twist, The Supreme Court, the Media, and Public
Opinion: Comparing Experimental and Observational Methods, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 223, 227–28
(2016) (discussing the features of Supreme Court cases that increase the likelihood of media
coverage).
25. See Chiang, supra note 10, at 104 (“The complaint in today’s institutional reform
litigation is a powerful shame-generating tool. The idea of the complaint as an opportunity for
story telling is not a new one, and litigators know that the most compelling cases rest upon the
most compelling stories.”).
26. Laurie Kratky Doré, Settlement, Secrecy, and Judicial Discretion: South Carolina’s New
Rules Governing the Sealing of Settlements, 55 S.C. L. REV. 791, 798–99 (2004); Andrew D.
Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing Public Access to Information
Generated Through Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 375, 379 (2006); Minna J. Kotkin, Secrecy
in Context: The Shadowy Life of Civil Rights Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 583–84 (2006).
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investigation: financial, policy, regulatory spillover, and barriers to
entry. This analysis is important—even to lawyers who already
incorporate reputational effects into their litigation strategies—
because we need to understand how litigation creates reputational
sanctions and the mechanics by which these sanctions drive change.27
Financial sanctions are the most familiar, as we often associate
them with “naming and shaming” campaigns and consumer boycotts of
companies exposed as polluters, human rights abusers, cheaters, or
liars. These types of financial sanctions are wielded by consumers who
convert information of misdeeds into financial consequences for an
organization, as opposed to financial penalties imposed directly by
adjudicatory processes. Policy sanctions result when an organization’s
reputation undermines or leaves it without any legitimacy to offer
policy solutions, as when tobacco companies tried to help make health
policy after their public relations tactics were revealed.28 The
regulatory spillover sanction occurs when the misdeeds of one bad
industry actor compromise the reputation of its industry peers.
Consider Volkswagen (VW) and the effects of its cheating scandal for
auto manufacturers around the world, as other national regulators
initiated investigations into the emissions performances of VW and of
its competitors.29 Finally, reputational sanctions can serve as a barrier
to entry for new businesses in a market. Incumbent businesses use
reputational sanctions strategically to delegitimize a potential
competitor in the public’s mind,30 as when the taxi industry raised

27. Chiang, supra note 10, at 87 (arguing for improved understanding of how litigation
shames organizations, even when litigators already employ these strategies in their “playbook”).
28. Thomas Bollyky & David Fidler, Has a Global Tobacco Treaty Made a Difference?
ATLANTIC (Feb. 28, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/02/has-a-globaltobacco-treaty-made-a-difference/386399/ [https://perma.cc/A7KX-M92J] (describing how
revelations about the tobacco industry’s “systematic industry deception” about health effects led
to its ostracism as “a global pariah,” and simultaneously increased support for an international
treaty on tobacco control and “undermin[ed] the industry’s attempts to kill it”).
29. See William Boston, Volkswagen Emissions Investigations Should Widen to Entire Auto
Industry, Officials Say, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 22, 2015, 7:51 AM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/
volkswagen-emissions-investigations-should-widen-to-entire-auto-industry-officials-say-1442915
079 [https://perma.cc/NEG3-CSHJ] (reporting that French, British, German, and Italian
regulators were considering investigating the broader auto industry for similar emissions fraud).
30. Alex Bitektine, Legitimacy-Based Entry Deterrence in Inter-Population Competition, 11
CORP. REPUTATION REV. 73, 76 (2008).
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allegations against Uber31 or the hotel chains against Airbnb.32
As previously mentioned, reputational sanctions are not unique
products of litigation. But one attribute that makes litigation special is
the way it attracts media attention;33 the media may not be as likely to
follow allegations unsupported by litigation.34 Because litigation draws
in the media, which can then act as an information intermediary, it can
expand the audience for the information shared within the judicial
process.35
Reputational regulation is not the first strategy to capitalize on the
indirect effects of litigation. The extensive scholarship on social
movements illuminates the benefits of litigation for public education,
political mobilization, identity formation, resource allocation
(primarily from elites), and values validation, among other benefits.36
All these benefits foster conditions conducive for organizational

31. Serena Saitto, Inside Big Taxi’s Dirty War with Uber, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 11, 2015, 8:00
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-11/inside-big-taxi-s-dirty-war-with-uber
[https://perma.cc/9R28-Q72R] (explaining how the taxi trade association hired a publicity expert
to gather and disseminate unfavorable information about Uber).
32. Christopher Elliott, Big Hotels’ Plan To Win Customers from Airbnb, FORTUNE (Jan.
27, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2016/01/27/big-hotels-airbnb/ [https://perma.cc/2QG28HVL] (explaining that the hotel industry is funding research suggesting that “some Airbnb
operators are running ‘illegal’ hotels”).
33. Perry Parks, Summer for the Scientists? The Scopes Trial and the Pedagogy of Journalism,
92 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 444, 445 (2015) (“The trial was a major news event that
attracted up to two hundred reporters and included the first live radio broadcast from a
courtroom.”).
34. RICHARD MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS 194
(2015) (“[T]he media is more likely to cover the press release about a lawsuit than a press release
about legal claims not backed by a lawsuit. In the latter case, the absence of action creates doubt
whether the [attorney general] actually believes the claim he is making.”).
35. See Linos & Twist, supra note 24, at 225, 232 (“[T]he media’s role is distinctly important
to the [Supreme] Court’s influence on public opinion.” (citing RICHARD DAVIS, DECISIONS AND
IMAGES THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS 16 (1994))); id. at 232 (“[M]edia coverage of both
health care and immigration issues spiked after the Supreme Court decisions to levels not seen
before or since; no other actor or event, including the presidential debates, placed as much media
attention on these issues as the Supreme Court.”).
36. See, e.g., JOEL HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: THEORY OF
LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 214 (1978) (explaining how social reform groups used legal
proceedings to create unfavorable publicity that forced parties into a settlement); Chiang, supra
note 10 at 59–61 (describing similar strategies); Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52
UCLA L. REV. 477, 489 (2004) (describing social-mobilization effects of publicity) [hereinafter
Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest]; Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical
Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 959–62 (2007)
(discussing effects of litigation on social mobilization). See generally Douglas NeJaime, Winning
Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2011) (discussing the benefits to social movements from
losing litigation battles).
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change. For example, in the discrimination context, “law reformers do
not expect to achieve results through a court or administrative
order . . . . Rather, they use legal proceedings to generate harmful
publicity that will force the discriminator into a settlement.”37 Along
these lines, the Environmental Defense Fund used litigation
concerning the use of DDT to “dramatize the dangers of
environmental degradation and to launch a massive, and successful,
fund-raising drive.”38
Reputational regulation similarly focuses on the particular
institutional vulnerabilities of the organizations at issue. Specifically,
reputational sanctions encourage organizational change by bringing an
organization to a crisis point where it is denied access to a resource it
values—capital, market entry, policymaking role, autonomy—unless it
demonstrates change to those withholding those resources.
This Article’s central thesis is intuitive. We expect demonstrations
of good behavior by organizations that have lost public favor: change
follows scandal. What this Article adds to our collective intuition is a
deeper analysis of the mechanisms through which the latter leads to the
former. This Article differentiates between different types of
reputational sanctions, begins to understand the roles of litigants and
prosecutors, and identifies the information-transmission functions of
litigation.
Better understanding of these reputational dynamics leads to a
number of normative implications for civil and criminal litigation
strategy. This analysis reveals the importance of process over
outcomes—the release of information through the adjudicative process
potentially results in organizational change that may be more
significant than any remedy or punishment a court could order, if a case
even survives that long. This is consistent with the view that “litigation
itself can be a valuable player in the marketplace of ideas and that the
publicity gained for causes via litigation may benefit the cause
regardless of whether the litigators actually prevail in the courts.”39 The
analysis offered here reveals additional benefits of prioritizing process
over outcome. It also reveals that the costs to the public interest of

37. HANDLER, supra note 36, at 214.
38. Id. at 216.
39. Chiang, supra note 10, at 69–70; see also Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, supra note
36, at 479 (“[C]ourts not only function as adjudicators of private disputes, or institutions that
implement social reforms, but as arenas where political and social movements agitate for, and
communicate, their legal and political agenda.”).
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court secrecy and arbitration may be higher than many suspect; these
impediments obstruct not only the public-notice function but also the
effect of reputational incentives and, consequently, the likelihood of
responsive organizational change. Finally, it reveals a more
comprehensive picture of the impact of litigation, whether desirable or
not.
Though the focus of this analysis is on organizational change, not
all organizational change will be desirable. Reputational sanctions are
difficult to calibrate and their effects are difficult to predict or control.
These sanctions may impose costs far exceeding any wrong committed,
or may even impose costs when there was no wrong. Reputational
sanctioning through the courts reduces the risk of abuse because of the
gatekeeping function performed by pleading standards, professional
rules, the adversarial process of truth finding, and review by judge and
jury, among other checks. These checks distinguish the production of
reputational sanctions via courts from the production of reputational
sanctions through other channels.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses two ways that
direct incentives have been used by litigators, courts, and prosecutors
to encourage organizational change. It also explains the origins of
organizational reputations and emphasizes the importance of
information availability to stakeholders. Part I concludes by explaining
the various advantages of the courts and the media, individually and
collectively, in producing information that stakeholders use to evaluate
organizations. Part III discusses four types of reputational sanctions—
financial, regulatory spillover, policy, and entry—and provides a case
illustration of each. The case illustrations are taken from recent
organizational scandals playing out in the headlines and before courts,
congressional hearings, and government investigations: the Fédération
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) investigation
(financial), the Wells Fargo fine (regulatory spillover), the civil suits
against Uber (barrier to entry), and the responses of the oil and gas
industry to climate change policymaking (policy).
Part III discusses the potential risks of reputational regulation,
including the risk of frivolous litigation (such as in “strike suits”),40 and
concerns about litigation transparency and arbitration for reputational
sanctions. Finally, Part IV concludes by identifying the implications of
40. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 532 (1991); James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the NewIssues Market: Empirical Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 916 (1996).
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reputational regulation for evaluating the success of legal institutions,
identifying litigation objectives, and the reputational regulatory
potential of other legal institutions.
I. ENCOURAGING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE THROUGH
REPUTATION
There are a number of ways that legal institutions can encourage
organizations to change. Organizational change can result from court
order or non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreements.
However, the reputational effects of litigation and prosecution can also
indirectly encourage organizations to change their practices. Section A
describes how structural reform litigation and prosecution illustrate a
direct means by which legal institutions compel defendant
organizations into organizational change. It also explains the
informational effects produced by those legal institutions and the role
that the media plays in heightening those effects. Section B explains
how those informational effects make organizations more willing to
change and to borrow practices from other organizations. Legal
institutions can thus be used to indirectly encourage organizational
change.
A. Understanding the Information Effects of the Courts
Following Brown v. Board of Education, litigants requested
injunctive remedies to change the practices of public organizations. In
structural reform litigation, judges became architects of change within
large public organizations in order to bring these organizations into
alignment with Constitutional requirements.41 Structural reform
litigation departed from traditional dispute resolution in significant
ways.42 The focus of structural reform was not upon “particular
incidents or transactions” but instead on “a social condition that
threatens important constitutional values and the organizational
dynamic that creates and perpetuates that condition.”43 The victim in a
structural suit is usually a group, not an individual, and the
beneficiaries of the structural remedies may include individuals outside
the victim group.44 Finally, the hallmark of structural reform litigation
41. Paul Gewitz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 588 (1983).
42. Chayes, supra note 1, at 1282–83 (describing traditional litigation as bipolar,
retrospective, right-remedy interdependent, self-contained, and party-initiated/party-controlled).
43. Fiss, supra note 1, at 18.
44. Id. at 19–22.
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is its remedial focus that aims at institutional change.45
In the years following Brown, structural reform litigation
expanded from desegregation cases to include reform of other
organizations of public concern such as mental asylums and prisons.46
Today, however, structural reform litigation faces a number of
criticisms and obstacles, including concerns with procedural barriers;47
functional competence;48 supervision and enforcement of structural
decrees;49 separation of powers;50 and high costs of implementation,
especially for poorer municipalities.51
Prosecutors similarly seek organizational change within business
organizations through deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) or
non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) to obtain organizational
cooperation in significant structural reform of corporate entities
implicated in wrongdoing.52 The terms that organizations must agree to
usually relate to internal reform of the organization, cooperation with
investigations into individual employees, restitution payments, and
external monitoring.53
Like structural reform litigation, organizational reform through
DPAs and NPAs has attracted criticism. Critics have raised concerns

45. See id. at 27 (noting that such litigation focuses on shaping remedies in the context of the
ongoing relationship between judges and institutions).
46. Garrett, supra note 3, at 857.
47. Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunction: Oops . . . It’s Still
Moving!, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 143, 161 (2003).
48. John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent Remedial
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1121, 1138 (1996).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1140.
51. Rushin, supra note 5, at 1408–09.
52. Garrett, supra note 3, at 888 (“DOJ avoids trial by entering into pre-trial diversion
agreements, permitting organizations to commit to a rehabilitative program, and agreeing to defer
prosecution should they comply.”). These agreements reflect the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines that created significant incentives for internal structures that monitor for wrongdoing.
Id. at 860.
53. See Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Evolution of Corporate Criminal
Settlements: An Empirical Perspective on Non-Prosecution, Deferred Prosecution, and Plea
Agreements, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 537, 588–90 (2015) (comparing the increased use of
governance provisions in DPAs and NPAs compared to plea agreements). For example, in 2005,
accounting firm KPMG came under investigation by different government bodies for engaging in
tax fraud. Garrett, supra note 3, at 861. After the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a criminal
tax complaint against KPMG, the parties reached an agreement setting forth significant structural
change at KPMG: restrictions on its tax practice, implementation of compliance and ethics
programs, training programs, and protection for whistleblowers, among others. Id. at 863–65. In
exchange, the DOJ and the IRS ended the criminal prosecution of KPMG. Id. at 862.
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regarding expertise,54 selectivity issues,55 use of corporate monitors,56
the inclusion of unrelated provisions,57 lack of judicial oversight of
DPAs and NPAs,58 broad scope of prosecutorial discretion,59 and the
requirement of privilege waivers until the practice was later
discouraged.60
In structural reform litigation or prosecution, there is a direct and
close causal connection between the legal institution and the
organizational change: a judge orders a particular remedy or a
prosecutor and organization enter into an agreement addressing
organizational reform. Reputational regulation is an alternative
approach wherein public and civil actors rely on the reputational
sanctions produced by litigation and other legal processes to encourage
private organizations to change.61 Reputational sanctions are a byproduct of the normal operation of our adjudicative processes. These
sanctions can accompany even garden-variety civil suits because they
do not rest upon the remedy sought but upon the reputational impact
of the suit. They can accompany all types of litigation or investigation,
not just those seeking organizational change. The mechanism for
organizational change is not court or contract but reputation.
Definitions of organizational reputation are plentiful, particularly
depending on the organization being discussed,62 but many scholars
who specifically study corporations agree that corporate reputations

54. David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the
Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1326 (2013) (noting concern that
the focus of NPAs and DPAs on corporate compliance programs “involve[s] the Department in
management controls and structural reform that may go beyond its core area of litigation
expertise”).
55. Id. at 1327 (discussing selectivity issues based on firm size and nationality).
56. Veronica Root, The Monitor-Client Relationship, 100 VA. L. REV. 523, 533, 541–43
(2014) (providing examples from the Statoil, Total, and InVision DPAs, among others).
57. Garrett, supra note 3, at 917–18; Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the New
Regulators: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 174
(2008).
58. Uhlmann, supra note 54, at 1328–29.
59. See Garrett, supra note 3, at 918–31 (exploring the implications of and counterweights to
such broad discretion).
60. Spivack & Raman, supra note 57, at 180.
61. See supra Part I.B (explaining similar reputational strategies examined by social
movements theorists and contrasting those strategies with “reputational regulation”).
62. Violina P. Rindova, Ian O. Williamson, Antoaneta P. Petkova & Joy Marie Sever, Being
Good or Being Known: An Empirical Examination of the Dimensions, Antecedents, and
Consequences of Organizational Reputation, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1033, 1036 tbl.1 (2005)
(collecting definitions of reputation from marketing, sociology, economics, and other disciplines).
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result from what many different actors think about it.63 For example,
leading reputational analyst Charles Fombrun defines corporate
reputation “as the overall estimation in which a company is held by its
constituents. . . . represent[ing] the ‘net’ affective or emotional
reaction—good or bad, weak or strong—of customers, investors,
employees, and the general public to the company’s name.”64 The
“good” or “bad” reputation that a corporation winds up with is “the
aggregate of many personal judgments about the company’s
credibility, reliability, responsibility, and trustworthiness.”65
Corporate reputation matters to different stakeholders because it
helps them “gauge the probable outcomes of interacting with a
particular organization.”66 As such, a corporate reputation influences
stakeholder decisions on whether that actor will want to associate or
exchange with a particular corporation. A corporation’s reputation has
significant consequences for its operations, including its ability to
charge premium prices, recruit and retain employees, enjoy consumer
loyalty, lower operating costs, and use its reputational capital to
mitigate the risks to itself if and when a crisis strikes.67
A corporate reputation is a product of what various stakeholders
think about that corporation, but before stakeholders can form an
63. See, e.g., David L. Deephouse, Media Reputation as a Strategic Resource: An Integration
of Mass Communication and Resource-Based Theories, 26 J. MGMT. 1091, 1093 (2000) (defining
reputation as “the evaluation of a firm by its stakeholders in terms of their affect, esteem, and
knowledge” and noting “[a] firm’s reputation is produced by the interactions of the firm with its
stakeholders and by information about the firm and its actions circulated among stakeholders,
including specialized information intermediaries”); Charles J. Fombrun, The Building Blocks of
Corporate Reputation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 94, 100
(Michael L. Barnett & Timothy G. Pollock eds., 2012) (“A corporate reputation is a collective
assessment of a company’s attractiveness to a specific group of stakeholders relative to a reference
group of companies with which the company competes for resources.”); E. Geoffrey Love &
Matthew Kraatz, Character, Conformity, or the Bottom Line? How and Why Downsizing Affected
Corporate Reputation, 52 ACAD. MGMT. J. 314, 314 (2009) (“Corporate reputation is an important
asset (or liability) bestowed upon a firm by external audiences.”); Yuri Mishina, Emily S. Block
& Michael J. Mannor, The Path Dependence of Organizational Reputation: How Social Judgment
Influences Assessments of Capability & Character, 33 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 459, 460 (2012)
(“Organizational reputation is defined as the collective, stakeholder group-specific assessment
regarding an organization’s capability to create value based on its characteristics and qualities.”).
64. CHARLES J. FOMBRUN, REPUTATION: REALIZING VALUE FROM THE CORPORATE
IMAGE 37 (1996).
65. Id. at 72.
66. Mishina et al., supra note 63, at 460.
67. FOMBRUN, supra note 64, at 72–73; Deephouse, supra note 63, at 1098; Charles Fombrun
& Mark Shanley, What’s in a Name? Reputation Building and Corporate Strategy, 33 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 233, 233 (1990); Ronald Sims, Toward a Better Understanding of Organizational Efforts
to Rebuild Reputation following an Ethical Scandal, 90 J. BUS. ETHICS 453, 454–55 (2009).
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impression of a corporation, they need information about it.
Unfortunately, these stakeholders often face information problems
that make it difficult to evaluate a corporation’s behavior or its
products. These information problems are not unique to interactions
with corporations, but also extend to our dealings with other types of
organizations.
The first hurdle stakeholders confront is the problem of
information asymmetry between themselves and an organization.
Organizations are often in a better position to collect, aggregate, and
interpret information about themselves, but lack the incentives to
share it, particularly if it is not in their interest to do so.68
Even if stakeholders can get access to that information, they
confront other issues that impede their ability to use that information
productively. One issue is expertise and the capability to make sense
of the information that an individual obtains about an organization. A
second issue relates to the availability of too much information, which
can overwhelm a consumer or other stakeholder. These issues do not
concern the lack of access to information but, rather, unwillingness or
inability to understand it.69 The information is out there but for a
variety of reasons—time, inclination, and capability—we do not make
use of it.70
That is why we often rely on a variety of information
intermediaries to reveal, disseminate, explain, and analyze information
about organizations.71 Voters rely on their favorite news channels to
recommend political parties, individuals rely on financial advisors to
recommend investment companies, consumers rely on professional
athletes to recommend automobile brands, and we even rely on
celebrities to tell us what social causes are worth caring about. These
are all information intermediaries who sift through the universe of
available information and provide signals to us about the information
68. The NFL’s handling of information regarding brain injuries serves as an example. See
supra note 11–13 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 687–90 (2011) (outlining the failure of mandated disclosure to influence
stakeholders’ behavior due to the informational overload effect, especially in the credit and
healthcare contexts).
70. See Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1114–19 (2007) (discussing the limitations on the effectiveness of
information-based regulation).
71. See Roy Shapira, A Reputational Theory of Corporate Law, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
1, 9 (2015) (“[R]eputational sanctions in mass markets are largely determined by the
interpretations and diffusion of information through intermediaries.”).
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that is relevant and even the decisions that are correct.
The same is true when it comes to information regarding
corporations, including their performance, value, and character.
Information intermediaries “enjoy lots of analytic resources and often
have access to better information than ordinary constituents . . . . Their
opinions significantly affect the way a company is regarded by its lessinformed observers.”72 The remainder of this Section discusses the
information-enhancing effects of two important intermediaries: the
courts and the media. Each of these intermediaries supplies
stakeholders with both facts and narratives with which stakeholders
can evaluate organizational conduct and construct organizational
reputation.73
We are accustomed to relying on courts for one type of
information—legal norms—that tell us what to do and what happens
when we do not.74 But the information produced from litigation also
has significant factual value, informing the public what happened, why
it happened, and, critically, if it can happen again.75 At times, we pay
more attention to the courts’ abilities to determine facts about the
world we live in—facts unknown to us or contested by ourselves and
others—than the legal outcomes reached. Courts develop a factual
record that is relevant to others besides the litigants. Courts produce
factual information for public consumption in the form of pleadings,
expert testimony, filed discovery, and judicial decisions.76 Not all these
products result from a judge’s hand, yet the public tends to aggregate
all these products under the common, sacrosanct umbrella of “the
court.” That label is important because it accords information
associated with it a special kind of authority, which begs the following
question: when courts are one among many types of information
intermediaries that can inform us of facts about the world we occupy,
what is special about the information produced by the courts that
makes us more willing to believe it?
First, the courts can inform us of facts that we do not know and
may not have any way of knowing but for the courts’ information
72. FOMBRUN, supra note 64, at 60.
73. See Timothy G. Pollock & Violina P. Rindova, Media Legitimation Effects in the Market
for Initial Public Offerings, 46 ACAD. MGMT. J. 631, 631 (2003) (examining the impact of media
on stakeholders’ evaluation of corporate reputations).
74. John O. McGinnis & Steven Wasick, Law’s Algorithm, 66 FLA. L. REV. 991, 998–1000
(2014) (discussing top-down versus distributed forms of legal ordering).
75. Shapira, supra note 23, at 1201.
76. Goldstein, supra note 26, at 402.
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disclosure; this is the information-forcing function of the courts.77 The
rules of procedure, for example, empower private parties to obtain
information they might not otherwise access but through the aid of the
judicial power to command information disclosure.78 As such, courts
and the information process generally are credible sources of
information because they may be the exclusive source of that
information.
Second, even when litigation information is also available from
other sources, the public often views litigation-related information as
more credible; this is the information-transmission function of the
courts. The information revealed through litigation is evaluated by a
trusted class of opinion givers: judges.79 When parties file public
pleadings designed to persuade, how is a layperson supposed to decide
which version of events is more credible? We rely on the adversarial
process to test the strength of each side’s arguments and the courts to
parse the truth from competing sets of compelling narratives. Even if
the media broke the story prior to a lawsuit, the release of information
incidental to litigation allows stakeholders to reevaluate their initial
assessment based on the checks provided by the litigation process and
thereby to calibrate their reputational judgments of organizational
behavior.80
However reliable of an information intermediary the courts are,
information from the courts does not make its way directly to
individual awareness. We are all strapped for time and mental energy,
and there is a lot of information that comes our way during the course
of a day. Most people are not going to wade through dense, lengthy
legal pleadings or judicial opinions. Instead, we learn about legal news
as we learn about most other news: someone tells us.
We rely on other information intermediaries to inform us of legal
developments and explain their significance. One prominent
information intermediary of legal information is the media, at least in
part because it is free or significantly less costly than legal counsel, itself

77. Lahav, supra note 23, at 1683.
78. See Goldstein, supra note 26, at 402 (noting the public reliance on the courts to expose
wrongdoing).
79. Bradt & Rave, supra note 21, at 1264–65 (discussing the unique capabilities of MDL
judges that qualify them to act as information intermediaries, including coordinating exchange of
information, deciding information-intensive motions, and access to experts); Shapira, supra note
71, at 12 (describing judges as providing a “second-opinion” on information produced during
litigation).
80. See Shapira, supra note 71, at 13.
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another information intermediary of legal news. Specialized media
sources communicate, explain, and frame legal proceedings for
audiences who are reluctant to read a pleading or judicial opinion for
themselves.81 As such, litigation-related information passes through
two levels of intermediaries—court intermediary and media
intermediary—before it reaches the stakeholder.
Like the courts, the media also possesses unique qualities that
influence how individuals perceive the information it shares and,
consequently, stakeholders’ views on organizations. Specifically, the
media serves an important agenda-setting function whereby “[t]he dayto-day selection and display of news by journalists focuses the public’s
attention and influences its perceptions. The specific ability to
influence the salience of both topics and their images among the public
has come to be called the agenda-setting role of the news media.”82 The
media’s coverage of an organization and its activities contributes to the
public agenda because “the prominence of elements in the news
influences the prominence of those elements among the public.”83
The process of agenda setting begins with the attention that the
media accords a particular organization and its activities or products.84
Through cues such as the length of a story or its frequency, the public
will decide which organizations’ behavior most warrants their
attention.85 But the media does not stop there. It also provides a filter
through which the public associates the organization with a set of
attributes.86 This is the affective component of media coverage that
relates to tone and feeling about various organizations and influences
the perception of organizations: “By calling attention to some matters
81. For example, national newspapers, such as the Wall Street Journal and Washington Post,
devote sections of their publications to legal developments. Certain journalists devote their
careers to only covering the courts, especially the U.S. Supreme Court. Television personalities
also explain legal developments for their audiences. Even lawyers obtain legal news through trade
publications, professional newsletters, and firm bulletins.
82. Craig E. Carroll & Maxwell McCombs, Agenda-Setting Effects of Business News on the
Public’s Images and Opinions About Major Corporations, 6 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 36, 36
(2003).
83. Id. at 36–37; Pollock & Rindova, supra note 73, at 632 (“Therefore, in performing its
functions of informing, highlighting, and framing, the media presents market participants with
information that affects impression formation and the legitimation of firms.”).
84. See Carroll & McCombs, supra note 82, at 37 (noting the effect of media attention on the
perceived salience of the subject to stakeholders).
85. Id.
86. See id.; Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683, 733–36 (1999) (discussing the ways that interest groups feed information to
media outlets in order to increase the salience of an issue).
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while ignoring others, the news media influences the criteria by which
presidents, government policies, political candidates and corporations
are judged.”87
The agenda-setting function interacts with litigation information
disclosure in interesting ways. Although litigation may release initial
facts into the public space, those facts may be ignored unless a media
intermediary picks up those facts and amplifies it to an audience.88
Even if we hear the facts, we are not usually very good at processing
those facts without a narrative. Legal pleadings create factual
narratives but not necessarily the types of narratives that are salient to
a lay audience. The media helps the general public learn and digest
information elicited by the legal process. The public can then use that
information to encourage organizational change, the process of which
will be described in the next Section.
B. The Process of Influencing Organizational Change: Priming,
Pivoting, and Positioning
In contrast to the organizational reform strategies explained in
Part I.A, reputational regulation relies on reputational sanctions to
incentivize organizations to change.
This is not new. Social movement theorists shared the benefits of
litigation publicity for encouraging organizational change by driving
the defendant organization to the negotiating table in order to reach a
settlement,89 educate the public on a cause,90 secure funding and other
resources for the plaintiff organizations,91 and construct a social
movement’s organizational identity, including motivating its
members.92 Both social movements theory and reputational regulation
are less court-centered than traditional litigation because both
approaches use legal processes to achieve extralegal objectives rather

87. See Carroll & McCombs, supra note 82, at 37.
88. See Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, supra note 36, at 487.
89. See Chiang, supra note 10, at 79 (“[S]haming can be used to close gaps between existing
doctrine and the desired reform by serving as an added source of pressure for defendants to come
to the bargaining table when plaintiffs’ purely legal entitlements may not otherwise be
sufficient.”).
90. See Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, supra note 36, at 481–82 (providing examples of
how “political movements have used courts to further public debate on important constitutional
issues”).
91. HANDLER, supra note 36, at 216.
92. NeJaime, supra note 36, at 972–86.
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than relying on legal remedies to achieve the social objectives desired.93
Both analyses also reveal the productive social benefits of legal
processes that, upon initial evaluation, “fail” to produce legal solutions
to organizational misconduct.94
Under reputational regulation, organizational change depends on
the particular institutional vulnerabilities of the organizations at issue.
Specifically, reputational sanctions can be used to influence
organizational change: stakeholders wield those sanctions to deny an
organization access to a resource that it values unless that organization
demonstrates change to those withholding the relevant resources.95
The denial of resources and the proof of change are attenuated; the
parties involved may never occupy the same room or even meet. They
signal each other through media fora as one set of parties
communicates the consequences of poor organizational behavior and
another set of parties responds with proof of their redemption.
Publicity increases pressure on organizations to change but does
not by itself determine the types of changes that the organization
adopts; those desiring change must not only incentivize organizations
to change but to change for the better. For example, social movements
theorists explained that one advantage of litigation publicity is that it
brings the organization to the negotiation table to settle on
organizational change strategies with other stakeholders.96
In contrast, reputational regulation influences the way that
organizations change by priming, pivoting, and positioning.97 Priming
refers to the creation of conditions that make an organization willing
to undertake institutional change. Pivoting occurs when an
organization fosters closer ties to one organization while
simultaneously cutting its ties to another. Positioning describes the
institutional constraints that an organization confronts when it tries to
change its identity to appear more legitimate to the public’s perception.

93. See HANDLER, supra note 36, at 192 (describing the use of the legal system for
“nontraditional” purposes).
94. NeJaime, supra note 36, at 1002–11.
95. Craig Deegan, Introduction: The Legitimising Effect of Social and Environmental
Disclosures; a Theoretical Foundation, 15 ACCT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 282, 293
(2002) (“[L]egitimacy theory would suggest that whenever managers consider that the supply of
the particular resource is vital to organizational survival, then they will pursue strategies to ensure
the continued supply of that resource.”).
96. HANDLER, supra note 36, at 214; Chiang, supra note 36, at 106–07.
97. Kishanthi Parella, The Information Regulation of Business Actors, 111 AJIL UNBOUND
130, 130 (2017).
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This stage of organizational change is called positioning because it
involves an identity struggle that plants an organization on a spectrum
between two poles, representing the identity it desires and the identity
it fears; positioning is about the institutional constraints created by this
identity struggle.98
Priming incentivizes an organization to change. For example,
litigation discloses information about an organization’s attributes and
fosters legitimacy crises for the affected organization. These processes
serve a priming function by rendering that organization more willing
to change. By its very function, priming necessitates a subsequent
action: we prime in anticipation of some future act. When litigation
primes organizations, it is setting up that organization to take some
further act by reducing its resistance to change. Priming only affects
the susceptibility or willingness of an organization to change; it does
not guarantee that the change will be a socially desired one. That is why
it is also important to pivot.
Pivoting occurs when an organization tries to copy one
organization while simultaneously attempting to distinguish itself from
another. Although pivoting is voluntary, litigation creates conditions
for pivoting. Industry actors often pivot when they confront a
legitimacy crisis created or exacerbated by litigation. They distance
themselves from organizations that further jeopardize their legitimacy
while pivoting toward organizations that could enhance their
legitimacy.99
Pivoting is a product of isomorphism, which explains why
organizations tend to resemble each other in their policies, practices,
and other operational features.100 Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell’s
classic study of isomorphism explained that organizations adopt
particular policies, programs, and techniques of other organizations in
order to improve their legitimacy, deal with uncertainty, or satisfy
societal expectations.101 These are all examples of isomorphic
attraction because their analysis generally describes situations when
organizations change to resemble each other.
98. Id. at 132.
99. Deegan, supra note 95, at 293.
100. Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM
IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 63, 65–66 (Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell eds., 1991);
see John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth
and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 340–41 (1977).
101. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 100, at 67–77.
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In contrast is isomorphic repulsion, which describes situations
when organizations change their practices to differentiate or distance
themselves from another organization. This distancing can include
creating new identities, adopting new practices, and forging alliances
with other actors. The key point is that organizations not only change
their practices to look more like some organizations but also to look
less like others. At times, an isomorphic repulsive force may be
stronger than an organization’s isomorphic attraction to another
organization; therefore, isomorphic repulsion may better predict and
explain organizational change in those circumstances. Isomorphic
attraction and repulsion can explain the forms of organizational change
by illustrating why and when an organization will copy or distance itself
from another.
Pivoting is important because the organizations toward which a
scrutinized organization pivots may have limited ability to influence
the organization otherwise. A pivoting organization may borrow
institutional practices from the organization it is pivoting toward but
may not do so without a legitimacy crisis motivating it. Outside actors
are limited in their ability to command an organization to incorporate
and enforce the nonbinding institutional rules of multistakeholder
initiatives, nongovernmental organization (NGO) guidelines, or other
unenforceable institutional rules.102 But while these organizations lack
coercive capability they do possess an important resource:
legitimacy.103 When, therefore, an organization’s legitimacy is tainted
by the reputational effects of litigation, the organization is more likely
to pivot toward these noncoercive organizations in order to enhance its
own legitimacy.104 For example, following a public crisis, a
transnational corporation may willingly adopt the nonbinding rules of
a respected international organization, such as the United Nations
(UN), even though it is not legally obligated to do so.105 The
corporation adopts these nonbinding rules because the crisis has
damaged its reputation, and it seeks to repair its image by forging

102. Parella, supra note 97 at 131–32.
103. Id.
104. See Bitektine, supra note 30, at 86 (“[W]hen two organizations are linked through a
transaction, partnership or public endorsement, the legitimacy ‘flows’ through such a link from
the more legitimate to a less legitimate organization.”); Parella, supra note 97 at 131–32 (arguing
that noncoercive organizations’ legitimacy induces business actors to turn to them when
confronted with a legitimacy crisis).
105. Parella, supra note 97, at 132.
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closer ties to another organization that is better respected.106
Positioning is the last step, and it refers to the institutional
constraints created by an identity struggle when an organization tries
to distance itself from its old identity and solidify its new one. This is
distinguishable from pivoting, which directs organizations to the actors
from whom it will borrow institutional practices. The information
produced by media-litigation intermediaries can trigger an identity
struggle for an organization if the information revealed presents an
image of the organization that differs from the organization’s desired
public image. This identity struggle has two consequences for
organizational behavior. First, organizations will adopt practices that
lead them to resemble the desired identity and appear less like the
feared one. Second, organizations often pursue their desired identity
by distinguishing themselves from other organizations they cast as “the
enemy.” By labeling other actors as the enemy, organizations change
their practices to differentiate themselves from those others so the
public can distinguish between the two.
Our legal institutions can encourage organizations to change in a
number of ways. While court orders and DPAs can directly contribute
to change, the reputational effects of litigation and prosecution can
indirectly encourage organizations to change. These processes create
informational effects that are amplified by media coverage.
The combination of priming, pivoting, and positioning through
identity struggles illustrates how the information effects produced by
legal institutions can provide indirect mechanisms for encouraging
organizational change.
II. REPUTATIONAL SANCTIONS IN PRACTICE
The information conveyed by both media and legal intermediaries
are processed by different stakeholder groups, including consumers,
investors, communities, and employees. These stakeholders translate
the information from media and legal intermediaries into reputational
consequences for an organization—consequences that incentivize
these organizations to change.
This Part analyzes four distinct but related reputational incentives
for organizational change: financial, regulatory spillover, barriers to
entry, and policy. These incentives do not necessarily operate in
isolation but often work in combination to encourage organizations to
106. Id.
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change. Consequently, the case illustrations below demonstrate
multiple, overlapping incentives at work, but they have been organized
to draw the reader’s attention to the operation of one incentive per
case illustration. This Article highlights incentives independently in
order to identify and explain the unique mechanisms of each incentive
and thus understand its particular contribution to organizational
change.
The case illustrations selected are as follows: the FIFA
investigation illustrates the financial incentive, the Wells Fargo fine
describes regulatory spillover, the civil suits against Uber demonstrate
barrier to entry, and the climate change treaty is exemplar of the
policy-based incentive. The case illustrations were selected based on
the following factors: (a) immediacy of events, (b) extent of media
coverage for depth of background information, (c) diversity of media
sources for comprehensiveness of information, and (d) litigation or
governmental investigation or inquiry. Two of the case illustrations
concern events that qualified for Fortune’s annual list of “Top Five
Corporate Scandals” for 2015 and 2016.107 The other case illustrations
may not have commanded significant media attention by themselves,
but they occurred in the shadow of significant political and industry
developments over the past two years.
A. Financial Sanctions: “Naming and Shaming”
The most well-known reputational consequence for an
organization facing bad publicity is a financial penalty levied by
consumers or investors. In consumer markets, reputational
consequences harm an organization’s bottom line when consumers
boycott products. In order to regain consumers, organizations will
change their behavior. Investors also use shareholder proposals
advocating organizational changes to address nonfinancial risks, such
as those relating to the environment or human rights.108 Therefore,
107. Chris Matthews & Stephen Gandel, The 5 Biggest Corporate Scandals of 2015, FORTUNE
(Dec. 27, 2015, 10:47 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/12/27/biggest-corporate-scandals-2015/
[https://perma.cc/Q962-DNK5] (listing the FIFA scandal); Chris Matthews & Matthew Heimer,
The 5 Biggest Corporate Scandals of 2016, FORTUNE (Dec. 28, 2016, 10:00 AM),
http://fortune.com/2016/12/28/biggest-corporate-scandals-2016/ [https://perma.cc/8TTG-XCKZ]
(listing the Wells Fargo scandal at the top of the list).
108. See, e.g., BIMAL PATEL, ROBERT KALB, ANDREW BOREK & RYAN PHILLIPS,
INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., 2015 UNITED STATES PROXY SEASON REVIEW –
GOVERNANCE PROPOSALS 2 (2015) (“The number of governance-related shareholder proposals
that appeared on ballots in the first half of each respective year has skyrocketed, from 172 in 2014
to 238 in 2015, reflecting a breakout year for proxy access proposals.”); Victoria Harper Ho, Risk-
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financial consequences can compromise access to capital and revenue
depending on the stakeholder exercising the leverage. The financial
pressure leads organizations to adopt changes in order to appease the
concerns of these stakeholders and to keep them as exchange partners.
The case study below explains how financial pressure from
corporate sponsors incentivized FIFA to adopt internal reforms in
2016. It focuses on the financial incentives that encouraged this
organizational change because, though FIFA is not new to scandal, the
reforms are new. Although it is challenging to draw lines of direct
causation, two factors distinguish FIFA’s most recent corruption
scandal from the rest of its tainted history. First, a number of former
FIFA officials are under government investigation by U.S.
authorities.109 Second, and relatedly, FIFA experienced a significant
financial crisis as corporate sponsors threatened to withdraw because
of FIFA’s tarnished reputation.110 FIFA’s leadership saw internal
reform as a way to win sponsors back and attract new ones.111 As such,
this case illustration is used to describe financial incentives in practice,
but in reality, the regulatory incentive through Department of Justice
(DOJ) investigation also played a significant role.
1. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). FIFA
is the international governing body for organized soccer, which makes
billions of dollars from media, marketing rights, ticket sales to World
Cup championships, and corporate sponsorships.112 FIFA is organized
under Swiss association law and currently has 209 member associations
globally.113 Each of these associations represents the football
federation of a particular nation or territory.114 These associations
comprise the legislative body of FIFA, the FIFA Congress.115
Additionally, each of these associations is a member of one of the six

Related Activism: The Business Case for Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647, 690
(2016) (“During the 2014 proxy season, investors filed 148 climate-related resolutions, a 50
percent increase over 2013.”).
109. See infra notes 117–19 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 122–30 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 128–37 and accompanying text.
112. Virginia Harrison, How FIFA Makes Its Billions, CNN MONEY (May 27, 2015, 12:17 PM)
http://money.cnn.com/2015/05/27/news/fifa-corruption-profit/ [https://perma.cc/NQM4-6W5E].
113. Victim Statement & Request for Restitution at 4, United States v. Hawit, No. 15-cr-252
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2015), ECF No. 102.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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continental confederations.116
In May 2015, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern
District of New York announced charges against several high-ranking
officials of FIFA and of “other soccer governing bodies that operate
under the FIFA umbrella.”117 The officials were charged with
“racketeering, wire fraud and money laundering conspiracies, among
other offenses, in connection with [the defendants’] participation in a
24-year scheme to enrich themselves through the corruption of
international soccer.”118 By December 2015, the DOJ had charged a
total of forty-one individuals and organizations as part of its FIFA
investigation.119
The U.S. investigation fostered a legitimacy crisis for FIFA that
grew into a financial crisis, which created an environment conducive
for internal reform within FIFA.120 While FIFA’s checkered history
may have been public knowledge, DOJ’s announcement of its
investigations into FIFA created a unique legitimacy crisis because the
information about FIFA’s misconduct was revealed by trusted
intermediaries—government actors—who signaled that they were
going to do something about the misconduct. The investigations into
FIFA tarnished its public image, which then fueled a financial crisis
that compounded the pressure for organizational reform. In 2015,
FIFA’s deficit exceeded $100 million, due to withdrawn corporate
sponsorships and legal costs associated with the various national
investigations.121
116. Id.
117. Press Release, U.S. DOJ, Nine FIFA Officials and Five Corporate Executives Indicted
for Racketeering Conspiracy and Corruption (May 27, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
nine-fifa-officials-and-five-corporate-executives-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-and [https://
perma.cc/6R5E-Z9UK].
118. Id.
119. Press Release, U.S. DOJ, Sixteen Additional FIFA Officials Indicted For Racketeering,
Conspiracy And Corruption (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/sixteenadditional-fifa-officials-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-and-corruption [https://perma.cc/Q747879A] (“FIFA and its six continental confederations – including CONCACAF, headquartered in
the United States, and CONMEBOL, the confederation headquartered in South America –
together with affiliated regional federations, national member associations and sports marketing
companies, constitute an enterprise of legal entities associated in fact for purposes of violating the
federal racketeering laws.”).
120. FIFA, 2016 FIFA REFORM COMMITTEE REPORT 1 (2015), https://resources.fifa.com/
mm/document/affederation/footballgovernance/02/74/17/54/2015.11.27finalreport_forpublicatio
n_neutral.pdf [https://perma.cc/KW2U-DZDC] (“FIFA is currently going through the worst crisis
of its history.”).
121. Brian Homewood, FIFA Faces $108 Million Deficit for 2015 -Finance Overseer,
REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2016) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-soccer-fifa-finance/fifa-faces-108-
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Throughout 2015, FIFA’s corporate sponsors withdrew en masse.
As early as January of that year, Castrol, Continental, Johnson &
Johnson, Sony, and Emirates had already announced the end of their
sponsorships, raising concerns that FIFA had become “toxic.”122
Sponsorship further declined following the United States attorney
general’s May 2015 announcement of criminal charges against FIFA
officials. Visa threatened to withdraw altogether, and Coca-Cola and
Adidas also called for FIFA to address its internal issues.123 Comedian
John Oliver added his own incentive for corporate withdrawal, offering
to endorse products of FIFA corporate sponsors that withdrew their
support of then-FIFA President Sepp Blatter.124
By the end of 2015, twenty-seven of FIFA’s thirty-four corporate
sponsorship slots were unfilled, with media reporting that “[t]he

million-deficit-for-2015-finance-overseer-idUSKCN0VY2UK [https://perma.cc/CGE5-8VAQ];
Rebecca R. Ruiz, FIFA’s Financial Disclosures Show That Scandal Has Affected Its Bottom Line,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/18/sports/soccer/fifas-financialdisclosures-show-that-scandal-has-affected-its-bottom-line.html [https://perma.cc/KT65-7YKG]
(reporting FIFA had spent $62 million in legal fees); Press Ass’n, Fifa Suffers £67m Loss After
Crisis Takes Its Toll on Governing Body, GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2015), https://
www.theguardian.com/football/2015/ dec/02/fifa-67m-loss-crisis-governing-body [https://perma.
cc/52HN-JR3Q].
122. Ben Rumsby, Fifa Loses Three Key Sponsors as Castrol, Continental and Johnson &
Johnson Sever Ties with World Governing Body, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 22, 2015, 10:30 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/world-cup/11364195/Fifa-loses-three-key-sponsors-asCastrol-Continental-and-Johnson-and-Johnson-sever-ties-with-world-governing-body.html
[https://perma.cc/5EWE-22CU].
123. Adam Withnall, Fifa Key Sponsors Visa, Adidas and Coca-Cola Pile on Pressure in Wake
of Corruption Scandal, INDEPENDENT (May 27, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/europe/fifa-key-sponsors-visa-adidas-and-coca-cola-pile-on-pressure-in-wake-ofcorruption-scandal-10280496.html [https://perma.cc/4QB4-9TKF]. Coca-Cola took an even more
active role months later when it called upon FIFA President Sepp Blatter to resign immediately.
Coca-Cola and other corporate sponsors issued their demand the week after Blatter was placed
under criminal investigation by Swiss authorities. Malcolm Moore, Fifa Sponsors Forced to Act
with Call for Blatter To Go, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/7be415ca-6aaf11e5-8171-ba1968cf791a [https://perma.cc//GA6H-G2C4].
124. On May 31, 2015, John Oliver, host of HBO’s Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, made
the following plea to FIFA’s corporate sponsors:
Please make Sepp Blatter go away. I will do anything. Adidas, I will wear one of your
ugly shoes. . . . McDonald’s, I’ll take a bite out of every item on your dollar menu. . . .
Budweiser, if you pull your support and help get rid of Blatter, I will put my mouth
where my mouth is . . . and I will even drink a Bud Light Lime.
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO television broadcast May 31, 2015); LastWeekTonight,
FIFA II: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO) (June 1, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=qr6ar3xJL_Q. On June 7, following Blatter’s resignation announcement, Oliver kept his
promises to the sponsors on air. Last Week Tonight (HBO television broadcast June 7, 2015);
1nacho566, John Oliver Keeps His Promise After Blatter’s Resignation (June 8, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Csi_BEgL_U.
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corruption scandal has proved so toxic that no new sponsors have
joined since the 2014 World Cup.”125 The year ended with Coca-Cola,
Adidas, McDonald’s, Visa, and AB Inbev sending an open letter to the
FIFA Executive Committee demanding significant cultural change to
reflect “[t]ransparency, accountability, respect for human rights,
integrity, leadership and gender equality.”126
The criminal investigations and the resulting financial sanctions
caused FIFA to experience “the worst crisis of its history” and suffer
significant damage to its reputation.127 FIFA’s leadership delivered dire
warnings about what might occur if the FIFA Congress rejected
reform. Acting President of FIFA Issa Hayatou warned that FIFA’s
existence “[may be] at risk.”128 FIFA’s new president, Gianni Infantino,
stated that “[i]t is now or never for [FIFA] to embrace change and to
bring football back to the heart of [FIFA].”129 FIFA recognized that “in
order to restore confidence in FIFA, significant modifications to its
institutional structure and operational processes are necessary to
prevent corruption, fraud, self-dealing and to make the organisation
more transparent and accountable.”130
The financial pressure exerted by the corporate sponsors helped
prime FIFA for reform, but so did the information revealed by the
criminal investigations into FIFA’s officials. The investigations by the
DOJ not only provided information to the public that resulted in
reputational sanctions but also created a background enforcement
threat.131 For example, the British newspaper The Guardian reported
that “[FIFA] insiders are desperate for the reforms to pass, fearing that
US prosecutors could reconsider the governing body’s ‘victim’ status

125. Press Ass’n, New Sponsors Are not Committing to Fifa Until New President Is Elected,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/dec/04/fifa-sponsors[https://perma.cc/E6S4-ASEB].
126. Open Letter to the FIFA Executive Committee, COCA-COLA COMPANY (Dec. 1, 2015),
http://www.coca-colacompany.com/press-center/company-statements/open-letter-to-the-fifaexecutive-committee [https://perma.cc/KDZ3-HT7Y].
127. FIFA, supra note 120, at 1.
128. Owen Gibson, Fifa’s Existence at Risk if Reforms Are Rejected, Warns Issa Hayatou,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2016) https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/feb/25/fifa-reforms-issahayatou [https://perma.cc/23LZ-V5B6].
129. Id.
130. Open Letter to the FIFA Executive Committee, supra note 126.
131. Pa Sport, FIFA Members Vote To Back Reforms Package at Extraordinary Congress,
ESPN (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.espnfc.us/blog/fifa/243/ post/2815643/fifa-members-vote-toback-reforms-package [https://perma.cc/9CXK-LPSW] (“The governing body’s lawyers hope the
reforms will show U.S. prosecutors that it is serious about changing its culture.”).
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in the continuing prosecutions if they do not.”132
This threat was not only relevant for FIFA officials but also for
corporate sponsors who feared that the reputational contamination
and risk of investigation might spread to them as well.133 As a result,
the criminal investigations provided necessary pressure for both
organizational reform and stakeholder (sponsor) pressure for reform.
In February 2016, 179 of the 209 members of FIFA’s legislative
body approved a historic reform package.134 The reforms included clear
separation between officials’ “political” and management functions;
term limits for the FIFA President, FIFA Council (previously FIFA
Executive Committee) members, members of the Audit and
Compliance Committee, and members of the judicial bodies; greater
scrutiny and supervision over the election of FIFA Council members;
and disclosure of high-ranking FIFA officials’ compensation.135 FIFA
also amended its governing statute to reflect these reforms.136
FIFA portrayed its 2016 reform package as a response to
corporate sponsors’ concerns regarding its recent reputational crisis
and internal organizational issues. In its report, the Reform Committee
explicitly stated that it “engaged with the commercial partners of
FIFA, in particular, FIFA’s primary sponsors, and has carefully
listened to their views on the subject of FIFA reform.”137
The investigations and ensuing financial crisis did not merely
132. Gibson, supra note 128.
133. Joe Leahy & Mark Odell, Fifa Corruption Scandal Threatens to Engulf Nike as Sponsors
Raise Pressure, FIN. TIMES (May 29, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/06d28cd0-055b-11e5bb7d-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/2SHR-BTUW]; Christopher M. Matthews, Aruna
Viswanatha & Joe Flint, U.S. Considers Role of Banks, Sponsors in Soccer Bribery Probe, WALL
STREET J. (Apr. 17, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-considers-role-of-banks-sponsors-insoccer-bribery-probe-1460937132 [https://perma.cc/5U94-WVTD] (“U.S. authorities’ focus now
has shifted to the relationships between sports-marketing firms and the companies to whom they
sold media and sponsorship rights . . . .”); Ben McLanahan, Sponsors Step up Pressure on FIFA
over Corruption Probe, FIN. TIMES (May 28, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/16f465ac-04bb11e5-adaf-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/2DXX-U9T2] (“Adidas must be careful that its Fifa
sponsorship does not become a reputational risk and damage its brand.”); id. (explaining that
Sony had permitted its long-term $305 million contract to expire in December 2015 and that
“Sony officials had previously expressed concerns about the widening allegations and the group’s
association with Fifa”).
134. Press Release, FIFA, FIFA Congress Approves Landmark Reforms (Feb. 26, 2016),
http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/news/y=2016/m=2/news=fifa-congress-approves-landmarkreforms-2767108.html [https://perma.cc/EQ5H-6CJU].
135. The Reform Process, FIFA, http://www.fifa.com/governance/how-fifa-works/the-reformprocess.html [https://perma.cc/KUA4-6M4J].
136. Id.
137. FIFA, supra note 120, at 1.
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prime FIFA for organizational change. The crises also created the
conditions for FIFA to borrow practices from other organizations that
could introduce meaningful structural reform in certain operational
areas. For example, FIFA pivoted toward the UN by requesting that
the former UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights,
John Ruggie, recommend strategies for how it could embed better
human rights norms throughout its operation.138 It also requested
technical assistance from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights.139 FIFA may not have pivoted toward the UN on its
own; instead, the criminal investigations primed FIFA to pivot by
creating a legitimacy crisis where FIFA would want to foster ties to
organizations with greater legitimacy, such as the UN, and cut ties with
actors who further jeopardize its legitimacy, like the defendants in the
DOJ investigation.
By pivoting toward the UN to enhance its own legitimacy, FIFA
set itself up to borrow practices from that organization.140 Outside
actors would have limited ability to command FIFA to abide by UN
human rights practices; the reputational consequences following the
DOJ investigation created the conditions for pivoting that led FIFA to
a similar path.
B. Regulatory Sanctions vis-a-vis the Spillover Effect: The Tragedy of
the Reputational Commons
Information disclosure from media, courts, and prosecutors does
not only affect the organization making headlines or the one named in
the complaint. Instead, this information can also have significant
negative consequences for the broader industry because of spillover
effects. Consider the examples of—and your reaction to—BP, VW, and
Enron. Our instinctual reaction to these names and the industries they
represent illustrates how an organization’s reputation is
interconnected with the reputation of its industry peers. As a result,
“reputations are ‘intangible commons’ because organizations share
both the penalties and rewards associated with the reputations of their
industries.”141
138. Press Release, FIFA, Report by Harvard Expert Professor Ruggie to Support
Development of FIFA’s Human Rights Policies (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.fifa.com/governance/
news/y=2016/m=4/news=report-by-harvard-expert-professor-ruggie-to-support-development-offi-2781111.html [https://perma.cc/9Z98-C78H]; Parella, supra note 97, at 132.
139. FIFA, supra note 138.
140. See id.
141. Lori Qingyuan Yue & Paul Ingram, Industry Self-Regulation as a Solution to the

PARELLA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2/5/2018 11:31 PM

938

[Vol. 67:907

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

The risk of reputational spillover is most acute when organizations
in the same industry are homogenous; their similarities inhibit the
ability of stakeholders to differentiate one actor from the rest of the
industry.142 “[T]he act of any individual firm is more likely to be judged
characteristic of the potential of all such firms.”143 As a consequence,
revelations of misconduct by one industry actor can place the entire
industry under scrutiny by stakeholders, who are now on notice of
particular risks.144 Organizational scholars have observed reputational
spillover effects in industries as diverse as oil and gas, diamonds,
apparel, chemicals, and cinema.145
Spillover effects can cause both financial and regulatory
consequences for industry peers—and not all these consequences are
bad. The spillover effect can have positive consequences on industry
peers because the homogeneity between the shamed firm and its
industry peers increases substitution possibilities between the two for
consumers or investors: one firm’s loss is another firm’s gain.146 For
example, consumers angered by Apple’s human rights practices can
purchase a Samsung phone instead. Here, perceived homogeneity
between firms is a financial advantage for peers in the same industry,
although that same perception is a disadvantage for the shamed firm
that loses out to substitution.

Reputation Commons Problem, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION,
supra note 63, at 278, 279; see also Michael L. Barnett & Andrew J. Hoffman, Beyond Corporate
Reputation: Managing Reputational Interdependence, 11 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 1, 2 (2008)
(stating that firms can both profit and be hurt by the reputation of their industry).
142. See Michael L. Barnett, Finding a Working Balance Between Competitive and Communal
Strategies, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 1753, 1763 (2006) (“[T]he more numerous, distant, and
heterogeneous are the members of an organizational field, the less intense is any reputation
commons problem likely to be.” (citing Andrew A. King, Michael J. Lenox & Michael L. Barnett,
Strategic Responses to the Reputation Commons Problem, in ORGANIZATIONS, POLICY AND THE
NATURAL ENVIRONMENT: INSTITUTIONAL AND STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 393 (Andrew J.
Hoffman & Marc J. Ventresca eds., 2002))).
143. Id.; see also Michael L Barnett & Andrew A. King, Good Fences Make Good Neighbors:
A Longitudinal Analysis of an Industry Self-Regulatory Institutions, 51 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1150,
1152 (2008) (“[W]hen one firm’s actions influence the judgments observers make of another firm
or an industry as a whole, a commons arises. This reputation commons intertwines the fates of
firms in an industry because all firms suffer when any firm engages in actions that damage the
industry’s shared reputation.”); Sheila Goins & Thomas S. Gruca, Understanding Competitive and
Contagion Effects of Layoff Announcements, 11 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 12, 30 (2008); Yue &
Ingram, supra note 141, at 280 (stating that reputations of organizations are interdependent).
144. Yue & Ingram, supra note 141, at 280.
145. Id. at 281.
146. See Goins & Gruca, supra note 143, at 16–17 (explaining the competitive effects of
information on rival firms).
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Spillover effects can also give rise to regulatory consequences for
industry peers. The same perceived homogeneity that increases the
likelihood of positive financial spillover effects via substitution also
increases the likelihood of regulatory spillover effects as government
actors, usually in response to public outrage, broaden the scope of their
inquiry to encompass the entire industry instead of just focusing on the
conduct of an individual organization. In this climate, organizations
may use new institutional initiatives or organizational changes to
manage their public perception and regulatory risk.147
The following case illustration discusses the consumer fraud
scandal of Wells Fargo. This case illustration demonstrates the
interaction of two incentives: financial and regulatory. Although the
story begins by demonstrating the financial consequences of
reputational sanctions, the case illustration then discusses the
reputational spillover effect of the Wells Fargo scandal on its banking
peers and the effect of regulatory risk. The example focuses on the
regulatory spillover effects instead of the financial spillover effects
because the former better explains the organizational changes
witnessed within the banking sector. The example highlights how
scandal and spillover effects contributed to a heightened regulatory
climate for executive compensation in the banking sector, and how
certain actors within this sector considered proactive organizational
changes regarding executive compensation in order to address this
regulatory risk.
1. The Wells Fargo Sham Account Scandal. Wells Fargo emerged
from the 2008 financial crisis with its reputation relatively intact
compared to other major banks.148 That status changed rapidly in
September 2016 when the CFPB fined Wells Fargo $100 million plus
$85 million in additional penalties for engaging in aggressive sales
tactics through which employees created up to two million fake
accounts in order to meet internal sales quotas.149
147. See, e.g., John W. Maxwell, Thomas P. Lyon & Steven C. Hackett, Self-Regulation and
Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism, 43 J.L. & ECON. 583, 613
(2000) (concluding that corporations are more likely to engage in voluntary self-regulation as
political pressure and the threat of formal regulation increases).
148. Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf Steps Down, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 12,
2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargo-ceo-stumpf-to-retire-1476306019 [https://perma.
cc/8YFL-TH3G].
149. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, supra note 17 (“Spurred by sales targets and compensation
incentives, employees boosted sales figures by covertly opening accounts and funding them by
transferring funds from consumers’ authorized accounts without their knowledge or consent,

PARELLA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2/5/2018 11:31 PM

940

[Vol. 67:907

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

The fine against Wells Fargo was the largest fine the CFPB had
ever imposed.150 But despite its size, the fine represents a small fraction
of the financial fallout Wells Fargo suffered as a result of the scandal,
which is consistent with empirical research indicating that
“reputational losses for financial misconduct exceed the explicit
penalties imposed by either public or private enforcement agents.”151
The fine created secondary reputational consequences that levied
another wave of financial consequences for Wells Fargo.152 For
example, a study conducted in October 2016 by management
consulting firm cg42 predicted that “Wells Fargo will lose $99 [billion]
in deposits and $4 [billion] in revenue over the next 12-18 months as a
direct result of the scandal.”153 The study’s authors attributed this
financial loss to consumers’ desire to switch banks, with the study
finding that 30 percent of those surveyed reported they are considering
alternatives and another 14 percent already resolved to switch because
of the scandal.154 Some states, such as Illinois and Ohio, also pulled

often racking up fees or other charges.”).
150. Id.
151. Jonathan M. Karpoff, Does Reputation Work To Discipline Corporate Misconduct?, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION, supra note 63, at 361, 376. Companies
often experience market sanctions that exceed government penalties when the conduct concerns
corporate fraud. See Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms
Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON., 757, 758 (1993)(“[W]e present evidence
that the reputational cost of corporate fraud is large and constitutes most of the cost incurred by
firms accused or convicted of fraud.”); see also Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S.
Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 582
(2008) (stating that in cases involving financial misrepresentation, “[t]he reputation loss exceeds
the legal penalty by over 7.5 times, and it exceeds the amount by which firm value was artificially
inflated by more than 2.5 times”).
152. In another example, proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Services
recommended in April 2017 that shareholders of Wells Fargo vote against 12 of the 15 members
of Wells Fargo’s board. Emily Glazer, Proxy Advisory Firm ISS Suggests Wells Fargo
Shareholders Vote Against 12 of 15 Directors, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 7, 2017), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/proxy-advisory-firm-iss-suggests-wells-fargo-shareholders-vote-against12-of-15-directors-1491579277 [https://perma.cc/6UEG-WLEH].
153. CG42, supra note 18, at 3.
154. Id.; see also Lucinda Shen, Wells Fargo’s Scandal Could End up Costing Bank $8 Billion,
FORTUNE (Oct. 24, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/24/wells-fargos-scandal-could-end-upcosting-bank-8-billion [https://perma.cc/AE5R-8YN3] (“[W]hile just 3% of Wells Fargo’s
customers were actually affected by the scandal, public opinion regarding the bank has fallen
dramatically, leading some 14% of customers to say they have already decided to bank
elsewhere.”); Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Says Customers Shied Away After Scandal, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 2016/10/15/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-sayscustomers-shied-away-after-scandal.html?mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/392E-QAGF] (stating that,
by October 2016, Wells Fargo customers had opened 25 percent fewer checking accounts and
applied for 20 percent fewer credit cards than in September 2015).
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their business from Wells Fargo because, as Ohio governor John
Kasich of Ohio explained on Twitter, “Wells Fargo has lost the right to
do business with the State of Ohio because its actions have cost it the
public’s confidence.”155 As expected, we also see the financial spillover
effects for the industry with consumers switching business from Wells
Fargo to its peers.156
At first glance, Wells Fargo’s fate looks like a perfect example of
the financial harm that can result from reputational consequences,
similar to the example discussed in Part II.A: government enforcement
action causes reputational harm to an organization, which changes the
terms with which stakeholders such as investors and consumers are
willing to exchange with the affected organization. But the scandal not
only exemplifies the financial consequences of reputational harm for
Wells Fargo. It also illustrates the ways that reputational harm can
have regulatory spillover effects for the broader industry.157 One theme
155. John Kasich (@JohnKasich), TWITTER (Oct. 14, 2016, 11:03 AM), https://twitter.com/
JohnKasich/status/786990903198093312/photo/1?ref_src=twsrc percent5Etfw [https://perma.cc/
2K6J-G57C]; Alistair Gray, Illinois Suspends $30bn of Business with Wells Fargo, FIN. TIMES
(Oct. 3, 2016) (reporting that “Illinois is to stop using Wells as a broker dealer for about $30bn
worth of annual short-term investments, such as repurchase agreements and commercial paper”);
Ohio Extends Ban on Wells Fargo Business by Six Months, REUTERS (Oct. 12, 2017) (reporting
that in October 2016 Governor John Kasich stated that he “would avoid working with the bank
on debt offerings or financial services for one year” and that the governor extended the ban
through April 2018).
156. CG42, supra note 18, at 8. Although Chase and Bank of America stand to gain the most
from switching, other national banks, such as US Bank, TD Bank, and SunTrust, among others,
will also gain deposits and revenue from switching. Id. These findings are also consistent with a
JD Power study that found that when consumers switch banks, they usually switch to another
large bank. Christina Rexrode & Emily Glazer, Wall Street’s Campaign Season: Dodging a Bullet,
Running into Wells Fargo, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 3, 2016, 8:58 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/wall-streets-campaign-season-dodging-a-bullet-running-into-wells-fargo-1478181423
[https://perma.cc/W9YV-9PH6].
157. For example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) sent formal letters
to large and regional banks, such as Citigroup, Bank of America and JP Morgan Chase, requiring
information about sales practices and incentive-compensation structures. Emily Glazer &
Christina Rexrode, Big U.S. Retail Bank Operations Under Scrutiny After Wells Scandal, WALL
STREET J. (Oct. 25, 2016, 9:11 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-u-s-retail-bank-operationsunder-scrutiny-follow-wells-scandal-1477400747 [https://perma.cc/3N6Y-KBW9]. The scandal
also shone a spotlight on those regulating the banks. Yuka Hayashi, Wells Fargo Isn’t the Only
Bank That Draws Cross-Selling Complaints, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 28, 2016), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargo-isnt-the-only-bank-that-draws-cross-selling-complaints1475058602 [https://perma.cc/U6U6-MK4L] (“Analysts say the problems at Wells Fargo put
pressure on government agencies to more closely regulate the cross-selling of products and
incentive compensation tied to tough sales goals.”); see also Sharon Gilad & Tamar Yogev, How
Reputation Regulates Regulators: Illustrations from the Regulation of Retail Finance, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION, supra note 63, at 320, 320–21 (discussing
the reputations of regulators); Shu-yi Oei & Diane Ring, Leak-Driven Law, 65 UCLA L. REV.
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that emerged in the wake of Wells Fargo scandal was the need for
accountability from actors at the very top of these banks, including how
executive compensation might be used to encourage accountability.158
Following the 2008 financial crisis, large U.S. banks introduced or
strengthened clawback policies in order to increase executives’
accountability for taking risks.159 The rules differ among banks, but
they usually authorize banks to take back stock awards or
compensation if an executive misbehaves, such as by taking improper
risks or underperforming, or if a bank needs to significantly restate
results.160 For example, Wells Fargo’s specific clawback provision
allows the bank to recover compensation when “‘misconduct’ by an
executive officer [ ]contributes to the company having to restate all or
a significant portion of its financial statements” or “incentive
compensation was based on materially inaccurate financial
information, whether or not the executive was responsible.”161 In the
wake of the Wells Fargo scandal, Wells Fargo’s board utilized the
clawback provision and former CEO John Stumpf gave back $41
million, making him the “the first CEO of a major U.S. bank to actually
have to give back significant pay or benefits as the result of a
scandal.”162
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 37–40) (describing the risk of sub-optimal tax policymaking
when leaked tax information increases pressure on tax authorities to respond).
158. Victoria Finkle, House Panel Questions Fed Chief on Wells Fargo Scandal, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/business/dealbook/house-panel-questionsfed-chief-on-wells-fargo-scandal.html?mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/6ZX6-2KY3] (“How can linelevel workers be held accountable to the degree that they clearly have been, and yet nobody in
the upper level of management seems to be taking responsibility for it?” (quoting Representative
Keith Ellison)).
159. Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 144–45
(2011); Oran & Kerber, supra note 20.
160. Oran & Kerber, supra note 20.
161. Kevin Wack, Wells Fargo Scandal Will Rewrite the Book on Clawing Back Pay,
AMERICAN BANKER (Sept. 16, 2016) (quoting Wells Fargo’s 2016 proxy statement), https://
www.americanbanker.com/news/wells-fargo-scandal-will-rewrite-the-book-on-clawing-back-pay
[http://perma.cc/D6Q3-BJKV] (quoting Wells Fargo’s 2016 proxy statement).
162. Oran & Kerber, supra note 20; see INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS OF THE BOARD OF WELLS
FARGO & COMPANY SALES PRACTICE INVESTIGATION REPORT 10 (2017), https://
www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/investor-relations/presentations/2017/boardreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/X77J-7A2K] (explaining that the Wells Fargo Board determined in
April 2017 to clawback an additional $28 million of Stumpf’s incentive compensation). The board
“has imposed forfeitures, clawbacks and compensation adjustments on senior leaders totaling
more than $180 million.” Id. at i. A few years earlier, J.P. Morgan Chase imposed pay clawbacks
on traders and executives involved in the London Whale trading scandal. Dan Fitzpatrick, J.P.
Morgan: ‘Whale’ Clawbacks About Two Years of Compensation, WALL STREET J. (July 13, 2012,
2:06
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303740704577524730994899406
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But the reputational harm of the scandal also affects the broader
industry; many of Wells Fargo’s industry peers took steps to
differentiate their practices from Wells Fargo’s.163 The use of clawback
policies may therefore not stop with Stumpf and Wells Fargo, and may
potentially prime other banks to use their own clawback policies as
another means of proactively distinguishing their consumer practices
from those of Wells Fargo.164 One commentator explained that Wells
Fargo misstepped by only taking action on the clawback provision after
the scandal was out of control, and that the boards of other banks may
“learn from this mistake.”165 Consequently, the Wells Fargo scandal
not only poses risk of regulatory reaction but also of preemptive selfregulatory action.166 The example of Wells Fargo reveals the
importance of two factors for converting reputational spillover effects
experienced by industry peers into organizational change by these
same actors: industry mistrust and regulatory risk. First, while the
Wells Fargo scandal did not improve the public image of large banks,
the banking industry had already struggled with loss of public faith. A
Gallup poll in August 2016 showed that only thirty-eight percent of
Americans view the banking industry positively—and that was before

[https://perma.cc/8RPB-DBAG].
163. See, e.g., Glazer & Rexrode, supra note 157 (describing media explanations provided by
senior executives at JP Morgan Chase and Citigroup regarding their own sales practices and how
these practices differed from Wells Fargo’s); Ramstad, supra note 19 (“I don’t even know what
the cross-sell is at this bank. Honest to God, I’ve never ever looked at that number.” (quoting
U.S. Bancorp CEO Richard Davis)). But see Rachel Louise Ensign, What the Wells Fargo CrossSelling Mess Means for Banks, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
what-the-wells-fargo-cross-selling-mess-means-for-banks-1473965166 [https://perma.cc/8VDH26FJ] (describing the use of cross-selling in the financial services industry); Hayashi, supra note
157 (“Problematic sales practices at banks may extend beyond the abuses revealed in this month’s
$185 million enforcement action against Wells Fargo & Co., according to a new analysis of
customer complaints maintained by the U.S. government.”).
164. Id.
165. Oran & Kerber, supra note 20; see also Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo Slams Former Bosses’
High-Pressure Sales Tactics, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 10, 2017, 8:43 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/wells-fargo-claws-back-75-million-more-from-john-stumpf-and-former-retail-bankhead-1491823808 [https://perma.cc/M7PB-GMQF] (explaining how the investigation by the
board of Wells Fargo into its sales practices “not only has rocked Wells Fargo but the broader
banking industry, with dozens of firms examining their own sales practices at the behest of
regulators”).
166. Oran & Kerber, supra note 20. The regulatory risk may have abated because of the
deregulatory stance advanced under the Trump Administration. Jen Wieczner, Why Yahoo CEO
Marissa Mayer’s $141 Million Payday Is Safe from the Hack Cover-Up, FORTUNE (Jan. 24, 2017,
6:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2017/01/24/yahoo-marissa-mayer-investigation [https://perma.cc/
YW8F-UKQM].
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news of the Wells Fargo scandal broke.167 According to Bancorp Chief
Executive Richard Davis, the banking industry is still attempting to
rebuild its reputation following the financial crisis.168 The industry
spillover effects of the Wells Fargo scandal jeopardizes this redemption
because customers can better understand what the banks did wrong.169
The average layperson may not understand how a collateralized debt
obligation works or its role in the 2008 financial crisis, but they do
understand the simple act of lying.170 In the words of an executive at
Citigroup, “Any event that causes people to question the motives of
any bank is bad for every bank.”171 Therefore, recovery of executive
compensation could signal to a mistrustful public that the banking
industry is willing to accept accountability.
Second, the Wells Fargo scandal unfolded at a time when the
Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) had proposed a new rule on
clawback practices.172 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) had already
required CEOs and CFOs to return compensation under certain
conditions.173 However, in July 2015, as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, the SEC
proposed Rule 10D-1, which requires more than did the SOA.174 When
the scandal broke, industry actors feared that the Wells Fargo scandal
may lead to stricter rules, more concrete requirements, and a faster
timeline to complete the regulations.175 The reputational harm caused
by the Wells Fargo scandal also potentially jeopardized the industry’s
position in the prelude to new regulation.176

167. Rexrode & Glazer, supra note 156.
168. Ramstad, supra note 19.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Rexrode & Glazer, supra note 156.
172. Press Release, U.S. SEC, SEC Proposes Rules Requiring Companies to Adopt Clawback
Policies on Executive Compensation (July 1, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015136.html [https://perma.cc/2E8Y-L9U9].
173. Sale, supra note 159, at 145.
174. See SEC Proposes Rules on Clawback Policies, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP 7 (July 6,
2015),
https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2015/07/sec_proposes_rules_
on_clawback_policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/WXH3-PC8E] (comparing the broader scope of Rule
10D-1 to the more narrow provisions of SOA).
175. Oran & Kerber, supra note 20.
176. See Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012, 1013 (2013)
(“When corporate actors lose sight of the fact that the companies they run and decisions they
make impact society more generally, and not just shareholders, they are subjected to publicness.
Outside actors . . . become involved in the debate. Decisions about governance move from Wall
Street to Main Street.” (emphasis added)). “Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley in the wake of Enron
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C. Sanctions Based on Barriers to Entry
Part II.B described how organizational change resulted from
enhanced regulatory risk as a result of the spillover effect, whereby
information regarding one bad actor taints an industry’s collective
reputation. However, regulatory risk can also arise from heterogeneity
as opposed to homogeneity. Incumbent organizations can intentionally
manipulate social norms to discourage the entry or subsequent
performance of new entrants.177 For this strategy to succeed, the
incumbent attackers need to be sufficiently different from their targets,
or the de-legitimizing strategies can backfire and cast a shadow over
both the incumbent and the new entrant.178 Heterogeneity is therefore
a precondition for these forms of intentional deterrent strategies.
Incumbent organizations manipulate social norms to delegitimize
their competitors and legitimate their own organizations in the eyes of
stakeholders such as consumers. These maneuvers strategically use
legitimacy to achieve some form of competitive advantage. While this
strategy can be used against mature industry competitors already
present in the market, the analysis in this section focuses on the use of
legitimacy as a barrier to entry for new entrants. In these battles
between incumbent firms and new entrants, incumbent firms used
organizational form as the means of delegitimizing entrants.
Incumbents seek to discourage entry by new competitors
organizationally distinct from themselves by delegitimizing these
organizations’ alternative organizational forms. These delegitimizing
strategies can have serious consequences for the new entrant, creating
enhanced regulatory risk, increasing financial costs, and changing
consumer preferences.179
The case illustration below explains how taxi companies, who are
incumbent actors in an industry, use information from lawsuits and
government action to delegitimize the way that Uber does business,

and WorldCom and those scandals were instrumental to its passage. The failures of private
corporate actors to prevent or adequately respond to those scandals—to self-regulate—were also
extremely important. Those failures resulted in more public scrutiny of corporations and
corporate decision making, which, in turn, created pressure for Congress to do something.
Sarbanes-Oxley was the result.” Id. at 1022 (footnotes omitted).
177. Bitektine, supra note 30, at 84.
178. Id. at 84, 87.
179. Id. at 80 (stating that strategic deterrence “may provoke regulatory action against the
new entrant or put the targeted organization into a situation of legitimacy crisis, which may lead
to organization’s isolation from important social networks and constrain its access to critical
resources.”).
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thereby challenging the latter’s ability to compete. Incumbent actors
can use legal institutions to create barriers to entry in two ways. First,
they can advocate for laws that ban actors, such as new entrants, from
operating unless those actors meet specific regulatory requirements.180
In Uber’s case, however, it entered new markets and operated illegally,
amassing public support to resist attempts to shut down its
operations.181 Second, incumbents can use information disclosure from
litigation to erect barriers to entry based on legitimacy by discrediting
an entrant’s operations. Specifically, incumbents can use the existence
of lawsuits and government proceedings to ruin the reputation of an
entrant’s organizational form and scare customers away. The following
case illustration demonstrates how legal institutions create
reputational sanctions that can serve as these types of barriers to entry.
Unlike the other case illustrations, it does not demonstrate
organizational change and therefore does not include the analysis of
priming, pivoting, and positioning present in the other case
illustrations.
1. The Information Wars between Uber and the Taxicab, Limousine
& Paratransit Association. Uber is a ride-sharing company that
challenged the traditional model of commercial transportation offered
by taxi companies in the United States and abroad. Riders request an
Uber ride through a phone app that provides the rider with information
about available drivers nearby, pricing, wait time, and vehicle details.182
While riders embraced Uber’s model of transportation, incumbent
transportation service providers challenged the entry of this new
market player. The thrust of this challenge was led by an industry
association representing the incumbent transportation service
providers: the Taxicab, Limousine & Paratransit Association (TLPA).
Uber’s business model is different from ordinary taxi companies, so the
members of the TLPA sought to use legal institutions to attack those
differences and delegitimize Uber.
Uber’s industry opponents used two strategies to reshape norms

180. See Boris Bindman, Keep on Truckin’, Uber: Using the Dormant Commerce Clause to
Challenge Regulatory Roadblocks to TNCs, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 136, 172 n.190
(2015); infra notes 183–85 and accompanying text.
181. Marcus Wohlsen, Uber’s Brilliant Strategy To Make Itself Too Big To Ban, WIRED (July
8, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/07/ubers-brilliant-strategy-to-make-itself-toobig-to-ban/ [https://perma.cc/55AY-P5NL].
182. How Uber Works, UBER, https://www.uber.com/ride/how-uber-works/ [https://perma.cc/
KN29-D7NX ].
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in a way that was intended to delegitimize Uber in the eyes of
stakeholders, especially potential customers. Under the first strategy,
the TLPA tried to shape legal norms to restrict or eliminate Uber’s
business,183 usually by opposing local regulations that would authorize
Uber’s operations in new markets.184 Uber’s competitors also lobbied
for increased regulatory requirements for Uber and other ride-sharing
services.185
The taxi industry also embraced a second strategy: using lawsuits
to shape social norms and public opinion regarding Uber.186 As stated
in the Washington Post, “[t]he battle over the future of the taxi industry
is in many ways an information war.”187 It is no secret that Uber faces
a barrage of lawsuits against it. Information shared in the lawsuits
provided the ammunition for a reputational battle between taxi
companies and Uber. After all, it is one thing for taxi companies as
competitors to sling allegations at Uber—the public may be
understandably skeptical considering the source of the information.

183. See Marlize van Romburgh, Meet the International Player Powering Big Taxi’s Fight
Against Uber, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2015, 10:43 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/
sanfrancisco/blog/techflash/2015/03/uber-regulations-taxi-industry-veolia-war-transdev.html
[https://perma.cc/2DSD-F2Y4] (“The way that they protect their business is by trying to use laws
to keep out competitors, rather than improving the rider and driver experiences.” (quoting Corey
Owens, Uber’s head of global public policy)).
184. Larry Downes, Lessons From Uber: Why Innovation and Regulation Don’t Mix, FORBES
(Feb. 6, 2013, 5:00 AM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/larrydownes/2013/02/06/lessons-from-uberwhy-innovation-and-regulation-dont-mix/#69596084de94 [https://perma.cc/JLC2-95ZG].
185. See Luz Lazo, Cab Companies Unite Against Uber and Other Ride-Share Services, WASH.
POST (Aug. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/cabcompanies-unite-against-uber-and-other-ride-share-services/2014/08/10/11b23d52-1e3f-11e482f9-2cd6fa8da5c4_story.html?utm_term=.78efd2670bb4
[https://perma.cc/2EZY-EZMG]
(explaining how Washington, D.C.-area taxi companies increased coordination efforts to fight for
regulation of ride sharing, including “joining labor unions, labor organizers and . . . lobbying
jointly,” and “sharing notes and filing complaints and lawsuits”); Saitto, supra note 31 (reporting
that according to TLPA leader Mark Joseph, one of Uber’s major competitors “prompted
investigations into Uber by sending letters to regulators in core markets like Colorado, Maryland,
and Pennsylvania”).
186. On the heels of President Trump’s Executive Order of January 27, 2017 restricting
immigration, the New York Taxi Workers Alliance announced a one-hour work stoppage at JFK
International Airport as a sign of solidarity with those protesting the order. When Uber drivers
did not cease service during that period, they were accused of “strike-breaking” and many
customers deleted the Uber app on their phones in reaction. Ashley Lutz, Furious Customers Are
Deleting the Uber App After Drivers Went to JFK Airport During a Protest and Strike, BUS.
INSIDER (Jan. 29, 2017, 11:38 AM) http://www.businessinsider.com/delete-uber-hashtag-jfkairport-taxi-strikes-2017-1 [https://perma.cc/4H5F-TUQF].
187. Nancy Scola, Uber, Allies Kick Off Campaign To Brand ‘Big Taxi’, WASH. POST (Sept.,
12, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/09/12/uber-allies-kick-offcampaign-to-brand-big-taxi/?utm_term=.39160de24d39 [https://perma.cc/TBB7-QJL5].
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But lawsuits elevate the normative effect of these allegations,
providing an alternative source for the narrative. The lawsuits provide
“second-opinion effects” in which “the process of determining whether
to impose legal sanctions produces information on how the company
behaved. . . . In that sense, litigation or regulatory investigations often
create another ‘third-party assessment’ of the company’s behavior.”188
In this battle for public opinion, both the TLPA and Uber
launched rivalling websites to serve as important information
intermediaries regarding the other’s behavior. The websites especially
reported legal developments in court rulings or regulatory action
concerning the other. TLPA’s website is called Who’s Driving You?,
and its homepage features a Twitter feed that collects and disseminates
information about Uber and its drivers that potential customers would
find most upsetting.189 For example, between October 27, 2016 and
November 4, 2016, a significant number of the Twitter posts dealt with
reports of sexual assault by Uber drivers against women and
children.190 The Twitter feed also updates viewers on any regulatory or
judicial decisions against Uber.
The taxi industry disseminates the information from the courts to
the public but is not the direct source of that information. For example,
the Who’s Driving You? website provides the reader with direct links
to court filings so that potential riders can read the allegations for
themselves. The difference between the two is the perceived authority
of the source of that information. By providing website users with
direct access to legal documents, the taxi industry provides a legal
narrative supporting what it has been alleging all along. It also draws
the public’s attention to the concern that Uber’s behavior is not only
undesirable but that it also potentially breaks the law, which comes
with its own set of normative consequences.191 These reputational
consequences, amplified by TLPA’s website, help delegitimize Uber in
the eyes of stakeholders.

188. Shapira, supra note 23, at 1213.
189. Who’s Driving You, http://www.whosdrivingyou.org [https://perma.cc/Q9JW-K9CX];
see @WhosDrivingYou, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/WhosDrivingYou.
190. @WhosDrivingYou, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/ search?l=&q=from%3AWhosDriv ingYou%20since%3A2016-10-27%20until%3A2016-11-04&src=typd [https://perma.cc/5HTKTH66].
191. For example, see the “shaming” scholarship that examines the expressive function of
legal institutions and punishment. See generally Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions
Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996).
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D. Policy Sanctions
Revelations regarding corporate misconduct not only render us
more likely to mistrust misbehaving organizations in their role as
market actors (how they act in the marketplace for goods and services)
but also as societal actors (how they interact in society at large). A
legitimacy crisis can paint an industry as untrustworthy, possibly
generating an existential crisis for the industry as a whole or
undermining its credibility in policy debates concerning its future.192
Diminished public trust in an industry, especially concerning its past
behavior in a particular area, reduces the likelihood that policymakers
and the public will believe anything that an industry’s actors have to
say. The consequence of this mistrust is that industry actors may have
a diminished role in policymaking, either through direct exclusionary
measures or reduced opportunities for consultation. When faced with
these consequences, organizations are more likely to adopt
organizational innovations that communicate their trustworthiness to
observers, such as new voluntary industry initiatives or
multistakeholder partnerships.193
The following case illustration explains the challenges
encountered by the oil and gas industry when its members want to
participate in climate policy discussions. Government investigations, as
well as the industry’s own actions, gave the industry a reputation as an
opponent to climate change policy. This reputational branding
strengthened state and NGO demands to exclude oil and gas
companies from international climate policy discussions. In this
environment, the oil and gas industry devised a series of voluntary
initiatives to change public perceptions of the industry. It also led to
organizational shifts within the fossil fuels industry and new alignments
among industry actors.
1. The Paris Climate Accord and the Oil and Gas Industry. In 2013,
dozens of NGOs specifically requested that the UN and the UN

192. See Deegan, supra note 95, at 293 (“Legitimacy is considered to be a resource on which
an organization is dependent for survival.”).
193. See Michael L. Barnett, Finding a Working Balance Between Competitive and Communal
Strategies, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 1753, 1760 (2006) (“Industries commonly intensify their collective
efforts when threatened by government regulation or loss of public approval.”); David Hess &
Thomas W. Dunfee, The Kasky-Nike Threat to Corporate Social Reporting: Implementing a
Standard of Optimal Truthful Disclosure as a Solution, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 5, 8 (2007) (“If a firm
fails to meet society’s expectations, then it must act to re-establish its legitimacy to fend off social
sanctions.”).
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Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) implement new
rules to protect global climate discussions from the influence of actors
within the fossil fuel industry.194 The NGOs recommended that the
UNFCC follow the approach of the World Health Organization and
Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
(FCTC), which restricts industry participation and requires that states
protect their policymaking from “commercial and other vested
interests of the tobacco industry.”195
This concern about the role of the fossil fuels industry in climate
change policy resurfaced in 2015 with the New York attorney general’s
investigation into Exxon Mobil’s climate change disclosures.196 The
investigation examined whether the company suppressed climate
change research and committed consumer and securities fraud by lying
to the public about the environmental effects of its products.197 Three
194. Open Letter Calling for Rules To Protect the Integrity of Climate Policy-Making from
Vested Corporate Interests, CORP. EUR. OBSERVATORY (Nov. 21, 2013), http://
corporateeurope.org/blog/open-letter-calling-rules-protect-integrity-climate-policy-makingvested-corporate-interests [https://perma.cc/URU7-K8SZ] (showing that more than seventy-five
civil society organizations had signed on to the open letter calling on the UN to protect
environmental policy negotiations from the fossil fuel industry’s influence).
195. Id. (quoting WHO, FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, at art. 5.3
(2003), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/42811/1/9241591013.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/
XXR3-VFYU]). Civil society actors also petitioned to exclude members of the fossil fuels industry
from participating in the Marrakech climate talks in November 2016, where representatives from
over two hundred countries met to discuss ways to implement the Paris Agreement. Michael
Slezak, Marrakech Climate Talks: US Accepts Petition Calling for Fossil Fuel Lobbyists To Be
Excluded, GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/nov/16/
marrakech-climate-talks-us-accepts-petition-calling-for-fossil-fuel-lobbyists-to-be-excluded
[https://perma.cc/5GQE-UTP6]. The petition supported earlier recommendations by developing
countries for a conflict of interest policy that would screen out nonstate participants based on
conflicts of interest. Id.
196. Lynn Cook, Exxon Mobil Gets Subpoena from N.Y. Regarding Climate-Change
Research, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 5, 2015, 6:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/exxon-mobilgets-subpoena-from-n-y-regarding-climate-change-research-1446760684 [https://perma.cc/SGP3LYZL].
197. See Justin Gillis & Clifford Krauss, Exxon Mobil Investigated for Possible Climate
Change Lies by New York Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2jL53WA
[https://perma.cc/6AH5-7PNG] (“The investigation focuses on whether statements the company
made to investors about climate risks as recently as this year were consistent with the company’s
own long-running scientific research.”). In March 2017, the New York attorney general accused
ExxonMobil of withholding documents from the investigation that related to correspondence
from Secretary of State Rex Tillerson when he was chairman and chief executive of ExxonMobil.
Christopher M. Matthews & Erin Ailworth, Rex Tillerson Used Email Alias at Exxon To Discuss
Climate Change, New York Says, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 13, 2017, 8:20 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/rex-tillerson-used-alias-email-at-exxon-to-discuss-climate-change-new-york-says-148945
0814 [https://perma.cc/EMY5-2KGT] (describing allegations that “Exxon hadn’t disclosed that
Rex Tillerson, the former chairman and chief executive, used an alias email address to discuss
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other attorneys general—from California, Massachusetts, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands—launched similar probes into ExxonMobil regarding
the company’s disclosure of climate change information.198 The federal
government also got involved, as the SEC launched its own similar
investigation into whether ExxonMobil fraudulently failed to account
for the impact of climate change and increasing environmental
regulation when valuing its fossil-fuel assets.199 Shortly thereafter, a
class action lawsuit was filed on behalf of ExxonMobil’s shareholders,
alleging securities fraud based on the same climate change
allegations.200
Given that the fossil fuel industry has weathered a lot of bad press
over the years, it is possible that these investigations did not create
unique reputational consequences for ExxonMobil. But the initial
story could not have broken at a worse moment for ExxonMobil; the
New York attorney general announced his investigation into whether
ExxonMobil had lied about climate change right as world leaders were
convening a historic gathering in Paris to discuss climate change. In
December 2015, representatives of 195 countries met in Paris, France
for the Paris Climate Summit and reached a landmark international
agreement on climate change: the Paris Climate Accord.201 These
countries agreed to report their progress on cutting emissions, with
risk-management issues related to climate change”).
198. See Kiah Collier & Jim Malewitz, Rex Tillerson, Exxon Mobil, and Climate Change
Probes – and How Texas Is Involved, TEX. TRIB. (Dec. 11, 2016, 12:00 PM), https://
www.texastribune.org/2016/12/11/everything-you-need-know-about-exxonmobil-climate-/
[https://perma.cc/LNZ9-Z2PY] (describing the investigations by the attorneys general of New
York, Massachusetts, California, and the U.S. Virgin Islands). Scientific American reported that
ExxonMobil had known about the risks of man-made climate change for more than forty years
but had not disclosed that information to its shareholders or the public. Shannon Hall, Exxon
Knew About Climate Change Almost 40 Years Ago, SCI. AM. (Oct. 26, 2015), https://
www.scientificamerican.com/article/exxon-knew-about-climate-change-almost-40-years-ago/
[https://perma.cc/LC3Y-C2VE].
199. See Bradley Olson & Aruna Viswanatha, SEC Probes Exxon over Accounting for
Climate Change, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 20, 2016, 7:55 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/secinvestigating-exxon-on-valuing-of-assets-accounting-practices-1474393593 [https://perma.cc/N5F
N-YZBS] (noting that the SEC had already been receiving documents related to the New York
attorney general’s ongoing investigation and then began its own efforts to request information
and documents from Exxon and its auditor in August 2016).
200. Press Release, Ryan & Maniskas, LLP, Ryan & Maniskas, LLP Announces Class Action
Lawsuit Against Exxon Mobil Corporation (Nov. 16, 2016, 6:45 PM), http:// www.prnewswire.
com/news-releases/ryan—maniskas-llp-announces-class-action-lawsuit-against-exxon-mobilcorporation-300364532.html [https://perma.cc/N2YA-8ZT5].
201. Coral Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 12, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2k9vJgw [https://perma.cc/B2SF-PPWX] (describing the historic
deal intended to address the risk of climate change).
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reporting duties commencing in 2023.202 The global strategy is to limit
global warming to two degrees Celsius, with the hope of further
reducing that limit in the future.203 The background of the climate
change talks increased the stakes of the industry’s image problem,
while the investigations were another mark against an industry
perceived as hostile to climate change policymaking.204
This background of mistrust and desire for exclusion helps to
explain why the fossil fuels industry resorted to a legitimacy-enhancing
device in an attempt to remain relevant in climate policy discussions
that affect them. In September 2014, a group of oil and gas companies
launched the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (OGCI) at the UN Climate
Summit in New York.205 The OGCI is a “voluntary, industry-driven
initiative, which will enable the Oil & Gas industry to . . . share industry
best practices, advance technological solutions, and to catalyse
meaningful action and coordination on climate change.”206 The OGCI
includes energy giants BP, Shell, Statoil, and Total.207 The ten OGCI
member companies provide almost one-fifth of all oil and gas
production in the world and supply nearly ten percent of the world’s
energy.208 OGCI’s mission is to “use our collective resources to
accelerate actions that mitigate the greenhouse gas emissions from the
oil and gas industry’s operations and the use of its products, while still
meeting the world’s energy needs.”209
On October 16, 2015, just weeks before the Paris Summit, OGCI
released its Joint Collaborative Declaration (the Declaration).210 Much

202. Vivienne Walt, Energy Companies Face Big Risks from Paris Climate Deal, FORTUNE
(Dec. 17, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/12/17/energy-companies-feel-the-burn-from-parisclimate-deal [https://perma.cc/8UUZ-ZE53].
203. Id.
204. See Benjamin J. Richardson, Climate Finance and Its Governance: Moving to a Low
Carbon Economy Through Socially Responsible Financing?, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 597, 603–04
(2009) (explaining how fossil fuel companies and their associated financial institutions suffer
reputational risks because of climate change concerns).
205. Press Release, Oil & Gas Climate Initiative, Climate Summit 2014: Oil & Gas Climate
Initiative Action Summit (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.oilandgasclimateinitiative.com/news/
climate-summit-2014.html [https://perma.cc/7XRA-T7VF].
206. Id.
207. About the Oil and Gas Initiative, OIL & GAS CLIMATE INITIATIVE, http://
www.oilandgasclimateinitiative.com/about.html [https://perma.cc/L8K8-WKG8] (last visited
Sept. 16, 2017).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Joint Collaborative Declaration, OIL & GAS CLIMATE INITIATIVE (2015), http://
www.oilandgasclimateinitiative.com/~/media/Files/O/Ogci/documents/ogci-ceo-Declaration-
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of the Declaration was devoted to communicating the cooperative
attitudes of the OGCI on climate change.211 The legitimacy-enhancing
functions of the Declaration are confirmed by statements made by both
industry representatives and their opponents. In October 2015, the
CEO of Total stated that the oil and gas industry “need[s] to be on the
offensive . . . We need to be serious to bring answers and solutions to
the table and not leave policy makers raising their fingers that they (oil
companies) are the devils.”212 This legitimacy-enhancing function of
the Declaration was exactly what the environmental groups feared,
labelling the Declaration as nothing more than “greenwashing.”213 In
the words of a Greenpeace activist, “Each and every one of them has a
business plan that would lead to dangerous global temperature rises,
yet suddenly they expect us all to see them as the solution, not the
problem . . . Arsonists don’t make good firefighters.”214
Oil and gas industry actors realized that no one would trust their
statements on climate policy so long as they were perceived as the
enemy of climate policy. This context not only primed the industry for
change but also led to interesting divisions within the energy industry.
These organizational shifts demonstrate both isomorphic attraction
and repulsion as oil and gas actors attempted to align themselves with
the UN, on the one hand, while distancing themselves from other
industry actors that could only compromise their “clean” image.
First, the oil and gas industry pivoted toward the UN, releasing
public statements supporting the Paris Accord.215 Critically, in a press
2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/69MT-4HUG].
211. See id. (enumerating the collaborative initiatives planned by OGCI member companies
and pledging to regularly report on their progress).
212. Jeff Reed, UN Climate Conference Gets Underway. Here’s What Oilpros Need To Know,
OILPRO (May 14, 2016), http://oilpro.com/post/20399/un-climate-conference-starts-mondayhere-oilpros-need-to-know [https://perma.cc/V8PC-GLXZ].
213. See Michael Stothard & Pilita Clark, Energy Groups Pledges To Tackle Climate Change,
FIN. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2015, 10:51 AM), https://www.ft.com/content/ed42bad4-73e0-11e5-bdb1e6e4767162cc [https://perma.cc/6HVS-Z6LJ] (“Environmental groups accused the energy
companies of trying to soften their image by supporting the Paris conference but failing to offer
concrete change.”).
214. Id.
215. See Darren Woods, The Future of Energy – Opportunities and Challenges,
EXXONMOBIL: ENERGY FACTOR BLOG (Feb. 23, 2017), https://energyfactor.exxonmobil.com/
perspectives/the-future-of-energy-opportunities-and-challenges/ [https://perma.cc/RGJ9-ZR68]
(quoting ExxonMobil Chairman and CEO as saying “I believe, and my company believes, that
climate risks warrant action . . . . At ExxonMobil, we’re encouraged that the pledges made at last
year’s Paris Accord create an effective framework for all countries to address rising emissions; in
fact, our company forecasts carbon reductions consistent with the results of the Paris accord
commitments.”). A year after the Paris Accord was reached, ExxonMobil wrote a letter to the
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release following the Paris Accord, OGCI identified similarities
between the Declaration and the Paris Accord.216 By connecting these
two institutions, OGCI demonstrated institutional convergence
between the industry’s solutions and what the public wants, reinforcing
the message that the industry is receptive and progressive on climate
policy.
The oil and gas industry simultaneously pivoted away from an
energy peer: coal. In order to absolve itself from “enemy status,” the
oil and gas industry passed that label on to coal companies in order to
deflect public blame away from themselves. Chief Executive Officer of
Total, Patrick Pouyanne, went so far as to announce in mid-2015 that
“the enemy is coal,” while “Total is gas, and gas is good.”217 Why blame
coal? Isomorphic repulsion can partially account for these industry
alignments. The oil and gas industry is in need of legitimacy, so it chose
to isolate coal as the energy actor that draws the most public ire,
making coal a strategic sacrifice in order to preserve the image and
credibility of the remaining energy companies. The oil and gas industry
abandoned the umbrella of the fossil fuels industry in favor of coal on
the one side versus oil and gas companies on the other; these are the
“positioning” tactics where organizations cultivate new identities. For
its part, the World Coal Association objected to this industry division,
explaining that the entire fossil fuel industry should work

Trump Administration advocating in favor of the international climate agreement. Matt Egan,
Exxon to Trump: Don’t Ditch Paris Climate Change Deal, CNN MONEY (Mar. 29, 2017, 1:50 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/29/investing/exxon-trump-paris-climate-change/ index.html
[https://perma.cc/X4R7-Q7W4] (“ExxonMobil doesn’t want President Trump to abandon the
global climate agreement reached in Paris.”); Aric Jenkins, Even ExxonMobil Wants President
Trump To Stick With the Paris Climate Deal, FORTUNE (Mar. 29, 2017), http://fortune.com/
2017/03/29/exxon-mobil-donald-trump-paris-agreement-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/NY42EQ4V]. Cf. Timothy Cama, Oil Exec: Trump Should Keep US in Paris Climate Pact, THE HILL
(Mar. 7, 2017, 4:20 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/ 322796-conocophillipshead-trump-should-keep-us-in-paris-climate-pact [https://perma.cc/RH3V-ZLM7] (“The head of
oil giant ConocoPhillips said President Trump should keep the United States in the landmark
Paris climate change agreement.”).
216. See Press Release, Oil & Gas Climate Initiative, OGCI Welcomes the Paris Agreement
(Dec. 20, 2015), http://www.oilandgasclimateinitiative.com/news/ogci-welcomes-the-parisagreement.html [https://perma.cc/LVC5-H396] (“In alignment with the Paris Agreement, the
OGCI’s Joint Declaration issued October 2015 recognized the general ambition to limit global
average temperature rise . . . .”).
217. Rakteem Katakey & Tara Patel, Big Oil’s Plan To Become Big Gas, BLOOMBERG (June
2, 2015, 6:04 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-01/big-oil-becomes-big-gasas-climate-threat-spurs-tussle-with-coal [https://perma.cc/Z3TA-ZL36] (“Oil companies that
have pumped trillions of barrels of crude from the ground are now saying the future is in their
other main product: natural gas, a fuel they’re promoting as the logical successor to coal.”).
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collaboratively.218 The quest for legitimacy thus not only shaped
institutional choices, such as the Declaration, but also organizational
alignments and industry divisions.
III. OBJECTIONS AND CONCERNS
Below, this Part discusses two factors that potentially compromise
the use of reputational regulation to encourage companies to change
their organizational practices. The first relates to whether reputational
regulation can continue in the face of procedures and mechanisms that
impede the flow of information from the courts. The second is whether,
even if reputational regulation can continue in practice, it should do so.
This Article has explained the advantages that reputational regulation
can offer for incentivizing organizational change. However,
reputational regulation may also lead to other effects—potentially
unintended and unpredictable ones—that may caution against the use
of reputational sanctions.
A. Challenges to Reputational Regulation: Barriers to Information
Flow from the Courts
Reputational regulation is dependent upon information from the
courts. Procedures and mechanisms that impede this information flow
therefore inhibit the creation of reputational sanctions. This Section
discusses two challenges to information flow that may impede the
operation of reputational regulation.
1. Transparency Costs of Arbitration. Arbitration is a form of
alternative dispute resolution wherein parties contractually agree to
resolve their dispute confidentially through a third-party
decisionmaker.219 Scholars and consumer groups, among others, have
criticized consumer arbitration for its lack of transparency, for
depriving the public of the opportunity to learn about risks to its wellbeing.220
218. Stothard & Clark, supra note 213.
219. AM. ARB. ASS’N, AAA CONSUMER ARBITRATION GLOSSARY OF TERMS 1 (Sept. 21,
2017),
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/AAA%20Arbitration%20
Glossary%20of%20Terms.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6AY-2ZAJ].
220. See Laurie Kratky Doré, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time To Let Some Sun
Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 487 (2006) (“[A]rbitration
confidentiality perpetuates public ignorance of continuing hazards, systemic problems, [and]
public needs.”); Ramona L. Lampley, Underdog Arbitration: A Plan for Transparency, 90 WASH.
L. REV. 1727, 1734 (2015) (“[W]ithout open access to the complaint, or decision, it does not flag
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This Article’s analysis reveals that the transparency costs of
arbitration are even greater: lack of information not only impedes the
public-notice function but also the potential for reputational
regulation. Shuttling disputes into arbitration denies the public access
to information regarding corporate wrongdoing. But stakeholders
need this information in order to trigger the reputational mechanics
explained above. As discussed in Part II, stakeholders receive,
interpret, and translate information produced by the courts into a
variety of reputational sanctions.221 In order to fulfill this function,
though, stakeholders need to have access to this information in the first
place. Reputational sanctions cannot incentivize organizational change
without access to information; therefore, private arbitration poses a
problem for the creation of those reputational sanctions.
For example, most people learned of Well Fargo’s sales tactics
when it was fined by the CFPB in early September, 2016.222 But a
number of consumers had filed lawsuits against Wells Fargo between
2011–2016 because of its fraudulent sales tactics.223 A Wells Fargo
consumer could have been on notice of the risk years earlier, possibly
protecting themselves from financial harm, except that these consumer
lawsuits were shuttled into mandatory arbitration because of a clause
in the consumer contracts.224 The public warning function of the
lawsuits was negated by the resort to arbitration and the confidentiality
that arbitration affords.225 As a result, most consumers did not learn of
for other consumers a potential claim or a warning that there may be a problem with the
manufacturer. This reduces the deterrent effect our court-based tort system has on
manufacturers, retailers, and service providers. Similarly, in the employment context, the lack of
publicity or transparency fails to advertise what may be widespread discriminatory practices.”).
221. For a discussion of the financial consequences due to the legitimacy crisis faced by FIFA
in the wake of the criminal investigations, see supra notes 120–33 and accompanying text.
222. Paul Blake, Timeline of the Wells Fargo Accounts Scandal, ABC NEWS (Nov. 3, 2016,
4:15 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/timeline-wells-fargo-accounts-scandal/story?id=4223
1128 [https://perma.cc/YR5J-P4MQ] (observing that the fraud allegations came to light when the
CFPB handed down the fines).
223. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint at 16–24, Jabbari v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 3:15-cv02159 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2015) (alleging violations of state unfair competition laws, among
others); Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration at 1, Jabbari, No. 3:15-cv02159 (dismissing complaint and compelling arbitration).
224. James Rufus Koren, Even in Fraud Cases, Wells Fargo Customers Are Locked into
Arbitration, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wellsfargo-arbitration-20151205-story.html [https://perma.cc/48JN-2MRQ] (“Judges in California and
federal courts have ruled arbitration clauses signed by customers when they opened legitimate
accounts prevent them from suing even over allegedly fraudulent accounts created without their
knowledge.”).
225. See Karpoff & Lott, supra note 151, at 761–62 (describing how fraud detection reveals
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the risks posed by Wells Fargo until years later.226
2. Litigation Transparency: Protective Orders and Confidential
Settlements. Arbitration is not the only risk to the operation of
reputational sanctions. The confidentiality provisions of the litigation
or settlement processes can also impede the informational flow from
the courts to the public, compromising stakeholders’ ability to levy
reputational sanctions against organizations.
One reason that courts are information intermediaries is because
they possess unique features that encourage information flow between
parties who are otherwise powerless to access that information.227 The
classic information-forcing mechanism is discovery under Rule 26 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), which provides parties
access to “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim
or defense and proportional to the needs of the case . . . .”228 Discovery
provides parties with broad tools to wrest information from the other
side, including interrogatories, written and oral depositions, and
production of documents.229
But while discovery educates the plaintiff, it leaves the public
ignorant. While we tend to recognize the importance of discovery for
the parties, there is greater controversy relating to the public’s access
to the information revealed through discovery but not filed. The public
has access to filed discovery because it becomes part of the public
risks to consumers); Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public
Dimensions of Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 528 (2006) (“[O]pen
conflict may serve to expose wrongdoers continuing to place others in harm’s way.”).
226. Senator Elizabeth Warren and other Democratic senators alleged this very charge
against Wells Fargo. As their letter notes:
A major reason that these outrageous practices continued for at least five years is
that Wells Fargo’s customer account agreement includes a forced arbitration clause.
These clauses eliminate consumers’ ability to bring a claim in open court or to band
together in a class action, before any dispute has arisen. . . . Even more troubling is the
fact that arbitration proceedings are kept secret, so that other customers are deprived
of the knowledge that their experiences might be part of a more widespread problem.
This forced arbitration system helps hide fraudulent schemes such as the sham accounts
at Wells Fargo from the justice system, from the news media, and from the public eye.
This is unacceptable.
Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Leahy, Brown & Leading Democratic Senators Call on
Wells Fargo To End Use Of Forced Arbitration On Consumers (Sept. 23, 2016), https://
www.leahy.senate.gov/press/leahy-brown-and-leading-democratic-senators-call-on-wells-fargoto-end-use-of-forced-arbitration-on-consumers [https://perma.cc/GGK5-K7VY].
227. Howard M. Erichson, Court-Ordered Confidentiality in Discovery, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
357, 363 (2006); Hadfield & Ryan, supra note 21, at 81–82.
228. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
229. FED. R. CIV. P. 30–34.
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adjudicatory process.230 But much of the information gained through
discovery remains unfiled and is not included in the adjudicatory
process; it “does not give rise to a presumption of public access”
because “[p]ublic monitoring of the judicial system does not require
access to materials that are exchanged during discovery but not
submitted for use in adjudication.”231
Contrary to this justification, though, public monitoring is not the
only justification for public access to the courts. Information obtained
through litigation also serves important notice functions, offering the
only way that consumers, employees, or other public constituents learn
of corporate practices that pose a risk to them. For example, consumer
groups blame court secrecy for the lack of public awareness regarding
the faulty ignition switches in General Motors (GM) vehicles.232
According to civil-society advocate Public Citizen, “The information
about GM’s defective ignition switches and air bag failures, along with
the injuries and deaths associated with them, was hidden from the
public in confidential settlements.”233 Although potentially relevant,
there are a number of reasons why information revealed through
discovery does not reach the public.234
Aside from these notice functions, we should also be wary of
confidentiality obtained through settlement and protective orders
because it restricts the operation of reputational sanctions235—which is
the very reason that many corporate defendants desire confidentiality.
Reputational sanctions invite the possibility of organizational change
within defendant corporations because of the risk of public outcry,
heightened regulatory oversight, or consumer backlash. These
reactions not only protect the public by informing it of risks but also
230. Erichson, supra note 227, at 360–61.
231. Id. at 362. One classic justification for this difference in public access to filed and unfiled
discovery is that public access to discovery is allowed in order to improve public monitoring of
the operation of our courts. Laurie Kratky Doré, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time
To Let Some Sun Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 474, 475–
76 (2006). Public access to filed discovery is therefore imperative because it is part of the
adjudicatory process, but it is not for unfiled discovery that is never used in court. Id. at 473;
Erichson, supra note 227, at 362.
232. Press Release, Christine Hines, Consumer and Civil Justice Counsel, Public Citizen,
Sunshine in Litigation Act Would Improve Public Access to Information About Dangerous
Products (May 20, 2014), https://www.citizen.org/media/press-releases/sunshine-litigation-actwould-improve-public-access-information-about-0 [https://perma.cc/UG9P-VXN6].
233. Id.
234. See Doré, supra note 26, 798–99 (discussing confidentiality requirements in settlements);
Kotkin, supra note 26, 583–84 (discussing the declining rate of cases proceeding to trial).
235. Shapira, supra note 23, at 1239–41.
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encourage corporations to change so that they pose less of a risk of
harm to consumers or other stakeholders.
B. The Risks of Reputational Regulation: Too Little or Too Much?
A separate concern with reputational regulation is that it is
difficult to calibrate. Its effects are unpredictable and attenuated,
raising the risk that the reputational sanctions may be too weak to
incentivize organizational change. Alternately, the sanctions may
prove
too
strong,
causing
unintended
consequences,
disproportionately sanctioning actors, and creating the conditions for
abusive use of reputational sanctions.
1. Problem of Short Attention Span: The Risk of Underdeterrence.
We live in a twenty-four-hour news cycle. Once the media moves on,
so do we, and thereby subsides any hope of sustained pressure for
change. If isolated events like media stories or court filings cannot keep
our attention for long, what we need are a series of events that catch
our attention and keep our focus.236 No one information intermediary
may be able to accomplish that task alone, but the interaction of
multiple information intermediaries could address that need. This
Section explains the ways that interactions between media-court
intermediaries and market-court intermediaries provide a continuous
stream of reminders to a public with limited attention. Critically, the
interaction between these intermediaries can partially offset the
deficiencies of each to keep our attention.
Media-court interactions amplify the audience for litigation
information.237 The problem is that the light the media shines is bright
but brief. In contrast, litigation provides a long time horizon, but the
public may not pay attention. The solution then is for litigation to keep
the media’s attention so that it keeps ours. This is easier said than done.
First, not all lawsuits are equally newsworthy and may not attract
media attention for very long.238 Better understanding of factors that
attract media attention to legal developments239 may aid this task but
236. Shapira, supra note 71, at 29 & n.97 (noting that litigation can add details that keep a
story in the news cycle).
237. Parks, supra note 33, at 445; Linos & Twist, supra note 24, at 228–29.
238. Interview with Professor Toni Locy, Dept. of Journalism and Mass Commc’n,
Washington & Lee University (Dec. 11, 2017).
239. See Linos & Twist, supra note 24, at 228 (“[M]any cases taken on by the Supreme Court
receive extensive coverage at the time of the Court ruling. Cases on politically salient topics,
especially those involving individual rights, tend to receive disproportionately more media
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may also open the door to risk of abuse when litigants craft pleadings
and litigation strategy to chase media attention.240 Second, even when
journalists are interested in a story, it is becoming increasingly difficult
for them to cover a lawsuit from start to finish because of litigants’ use
of protective orders and sealed settlements.241
Another risk is that business organizations will respond to
reputational sanctions by investing in shallow changes that address
public pressure for change but change very little in fact. These public
relations tactics may focus more on altering public perceptions of an
organization than on ensuring meaningful organizational change. The
challenge is twofold: first, how to ensure that stakeholders are not
satisfied by public relations reforms and instead sustain the pressure
for meaningful change, and second, how to ensure that stakeholders
can differentiate between the two. The information asymmetries that
prevent stakeholders from learning of harms committed by
organizations can similarly limit their ability to distinguish between
meaningful organizational change and a public relations strategy
designed to manage a reputational crisis.
2. Dangers of Shame: The Risk of Overdeterrence. Not all
reputational incentives lead to desirable results. The case illustrations
in Part II demonstrated the positive benefits of reputational incentives.
The discussion in this subsection highlights how these same types of
incentives can lead to undesirable outcomes. It may be hard to ensure

coverage relative to their share of the Court docket. . . . In addition, cases that attract many amicus
briefs and cases involving multiple dissents garner more coverage, as journalists often consider
these important and controversial, and thus newsworthy.”); Shapira, supra note 71, at 22
(“Judicial opinions add saliency by recalling the attention of the media to a certain issue,
providing media reporters with readymade quotes, and reducing journalists’ risk of defamation
liability. Opinions also add credibility by certifying existing information.” (footnotes omitted)
(citing JOHN D. LYTTON, HOLDING BISHOPS ACCOUNTABLE 95 (2008)).
240. Samuel Terilli, Lowering the Bar: Privileged Court Filings as Substitutes for Press
Releases in the Court of Public Opinion, 12 COMM. L. & POL’Y 143, 146 (2007) (“The tell-tale
signs of the public relations ploys include the lawsuit or complaint filed to generate publicity for
a cause through the selection of an obviously attractive target (a competitor or newsworthy
defendant, for example) coupled with plainly written and very quotable allegations, often
including outrageous damage claims and other allegations that far exceed what the law requires
in the pleading. Such pleadings invite public attention as well as a response from the opposing
side.” (footnotes omitted)); see infra Section III.B.3. I will be exploring this topic further in a
future work, tentatively titled Public Relations Litigation. Professor Parella Presents at Yale Law
Workshop on Informal-Formal Governance, WASH. & LEE L. FAC. SCHOLARSHIP BLOG (Oct. 4,
2017), https://wlulawfaculty.wordpress.com/2017/10/04/professor-parella-presents-at-yale-lawworkshop-on-informal-formal-governance/ [https://perma.cc/D9PD-K8GZ].
241. Interview with Professor Toni Locy, supra note 238; see Part III.A.
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that our use of reputational incentives lead to the former and not the
latter. After all, reputational incentives are clumsy instruments. They
are often unpredictable, attenuated, and can give rise to a number of
unintended consequences. That does not mean we should abandon
reputational incentives, but only that we must be cautious about how
we use them. The discussion below highlights three particular concerns
with reputational incentives: excessive harm, collateral consequences,
and risk of abuse.
First, we are accustomed to punishing by reputation. For example,
shaming sanctions are forms of punishment designed to penalize an
offender
through
embarrassment,
isolation,
and
public
condemnation.242 Examples of shaming sanctions include forcing an
offender to issue a public apology, displaying labels or stickers singling
out offenders, or wearing clothing announcing an offender’s crime.243
What makes shaming sanctions unique is that embarrassment and
other social consequences are the desired outcome. “Embarrassment
and consequent social isolation may result from any punishment; but
with most other sanctions shame and shunning are incidental . . . . With
shaming penalties, in contrast, embarrassment is the principal purpose
of the punishment.”244
The use of shame led some scholars to reject these sanctions out
of a concern for lasting effects: “When it works, it redefines a person
in a negative, often irreversible, way. Effective shame sanctions strike
at an offender’s psychological core. To allow government officials to
search for and manipulate this vulnerable core is worrisome . . . .”245
Additionally, even if judges may be skilled at creating shame, they may
be less skilled at “reconstruct[ing] that core” after the offender has paid
the penalty.246
Second, as explained in Part II, criminal investigations, indictment
and convictions carry significant reputational consequences for the
affected organization. The positive effect of those reputational
consequences is that it can force organizations to change. The negative
effect is that it can lead to collateral consequences that harm innocent
parties. It is this risk of collateral consequences that encourages
242. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1820–21
(2001).
243. Id. at 1823.
244. Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880,
1886 (1991).
245. Id. at 1920.
246. Id. at 1921.
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prosecutors to focus on reaching cooperative arrangements with
corporate leadership through DPAs and NPAs.247 What prosecutors
fear is a repetition of the Arthur Andersen scandal: Arthur Andersen
was an accounting firm convicted of obstruction of justice following the
Enron debacle.248 This conviction led to a range of collateral
consequences and eventually resulted in the firm’s collapse.249 This
episode illustrated the need for prosecutors to balance “aggressively
root[ing] out corporate fraud while remaining sensitive to the
considerable collateral consequences of moving criminally against an
entire entity.”250
Finally, reputational sanctions may be abused and levied without
justification. One reason for abuse is that reputational sanctions can be
cheap to produce. This Article examined reputational sanctions that
originated from litigation action, but courts are not necessary to
produce reputational sanctions; news media, social media, NGOs,
government officials, and market analysts, among others, can all
produce reputational sanctions of some variety. Social media in
particular lowers the production cost of reputational sanctions by
making it easier to detect conduct deemed “shameful,” and by enabling
rapid transmission of information. Social media dynamics increase the
scale of participation in shaming and, consequently, the magnitude of
the resulting sanction.
But not all the sanctions imposed across social media or other
informal media are appropriate; they are levied without a gatekeeper.
It is the presence of a gatekeeping function performed by the courts
that distinguish the “reputational regulation” discussed in this Article
from reputational sanctions generally. By involving the courts in this
process, those seeking to produce reputational sanctions must pass
through several “gates,” including pleading standards, professional
rules, adversarial process of truth finding, and review by judge and jury.
These gates introduce checks in the production of reputational
247. Cynthia E. Devers, Todd Dewett, Yuri Mishina & Carrie A. Belsito, A General Theory
of Organizational Stigma, 20 ORG. SCI. 154, 165 (2009); Garrett, supra note 3, at 880 (“The
overdeterrent effect of an indictment provided great impetus for the DOJ to resolve prosecutions
pre-indictment at the charging stage.”).
248. Jonathan Weil & Alexei Barrionuevo, Arthur Andersen Is Convicted on Obstruction-ofJustice Count, WALL. STREET J. (June 16, 2002, 11:28 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB1023469305374958120 [https://perma.cc/6DEX-2E9S].
249. See Garrett, supra note 3, at 880 (“The DOJ suffered great criticism following Andersen’s
collapse and has since moderated its approach to explicitly take into account collateral
consequences in organizational cases.”).
250. Spivack & Raman, supra note 57, at 166.
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sanctions—checks that are lacking in the more informal production of
reputational sanctions.
Even where reputational sanctions are appropriate, the sanctions
may lead to disproportionate impact because these sanctions are
difficult to calibrate and their effects are challenging to predict or
control. One consequence of such impact is that it can lead an
organization to exit the market instead of improving its conduct. This
is especially a problem when an exiting organization proves less
susceptible to reputational sanctions, but still does things at exit that
are undesirable. The need for change is still present but the toolkit for
incentivizing that change no longer includes reputational sanctions.
3. The Risk of Public Relations Litigation. The very effectiveness
of reputational sanctions may make organizations, especially
corporations, easy targets for frivolous lawsuits.251 In the securities class
action context, those involved in a public offering may contend with
“strike suits” brought by plaintiff’s firms following a steep and sudden
drop in stock price.252 The reputational consequences of the suit lead
the defendants to settle even when they believe the suit is
unmeritorious; the stigma is so strong that it encourages settlement
where it might not otherwise occur.253 The concern is that plaintiff’s
firms recognize the power of reputational sanctions and its effect on
defendants’ willingness to settle and, therefore, continue to initiate
future frivolous suits.
Frivolous suits may not only be brought against organizations but
also by organizations. When a scandal breaks, organizations associated
with the one “in the hot seat” may turn to litigation as a public forum
to voice their side of the story or tiptoe away from their discredited
associates. These actors are using the litigation stage for reputation
repair as opposed to reputational sanctioning.254
For example, following the FIFA scandal, FIFA filed a claim for
restitution arguing that it was the victim of corruption and not its
perpetrator.255 It used its pleadings—framed to garner media
251. See Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, supra note 36, at 517–20 (discussing imposition
of Rule 11 sanctions for use of litigation for publicity).
252. Bohn & Choi, supra note 40, at 916.
253. Alexander, supra note 40, at 532.
254. This point will be developed further in my future work, Public Relations Litigation.
255. See Victim Statement & Request for Restitution at 4, United States v. Hawit, No. 15-cr252 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2015), ECF No. 102 (“As a victim of the Defendants’ crimes, FIFA is
entitled to recover restitution under the Mandatory Restitution to Victims Act.” (citing 18 U.S.C.
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attention—to explain to the public that the FIFA of 2016 is different
from the FIFA corrupted by the officials under DOJ investigation.256
Of course, it could have made the same case through a press release or
another traditional public relations venue. But a legal complaint allows
an organization to use a legitimized and trusted system—the courts—
to frame themselves as the victim and their participation in the scandal
as minor, innocent, or nonexistent. Framing this narrative in the courts
may garner greater salience with the public than other public relations
methods.257
As lawyers, we know that litigation, on some level, is an exercise
in storytelling.258 Law professors impress upon their first-year students
the importance of developing facts into persuasive narratives. The
difference with the storytelling by FIFA or other actors who use
litigation as a stage is that the primary audience for these litigation
narratives is not a judge but the media and, by extension, consumers,
regulators, shareholders, and other stakeholders. This itself may not be
startling259 but the risks of this practice could be greater when
employed by corporations that use the litigation stage to pursue public
relations strategies that had previously played out in press releases and
other fora.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF REPUTATIONAL SANCTIONS
The analysis provided in this Article helps to illuminate the
reputational consequences of different types of litigation or regulatory
action. The analysis in this Article explores the ways that reputational
sanctions are produced, which also provides deeper insight into the
operation of features of our legal system, including reassessing failure,
effects of litigation on nonbinding law, and information effects
produced by other institutions. This Part will consider those insights.

§ 3663A (2012))).
256. Id. at 17 (“The Defendants are responsible for harming FIFA’s brand and bringing FIFA
and the game itself into disrepute.”).
257. See Terilli, supra note 240, at 145 (discussing the use of court filings as “substitute press
releases” in the Kobe Bryant civil case).
258. See, e.g., Chiang, supra note 10, at 104 (“[L]itigators know that the most compelling cases
rest upon the most compelling stories.”).
259. See id. at 105.
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A. Reconsidering the Functions of Activist Litigation: Aggregation
and Elevation
Analyzing the reputational effects of litigation may offer litigants
more reasons for filing lawsuits against organizations because lawsuits
serve important informational functions by collecting information in
one place (aggregation) and providing that information with the
normative significance of a court document (elevation). These
functions are important in themselves, aside from their ability to
incentivize organizational change. Through these informational
functions, lawsuits amplify the audiences for factual and normative
information—which may otherwise go unnoticed. Important findings
by domestic and international agencies may be ignored unless a legal
or media intermediary picks up that information; moreover, the media
may be more likely to disseminate information after a lawsuit is filed—
a lawsuit alleging human rights abuses, for example, is often more
newsworthy than a government or NGO report alleging the same.260 As
a result, the “educational value of litigation is often substantial even
where the case does not result in a legal victory.”261
For example, in Hodsdon v. Mars,262 the plaintiffs alleged that
Mars uses child labor in its cocoa supply chain and that the company
fails to disclose that abuse to consumers at the point of purchase.263
Unfortunately, like many similar lawsuits, Hodsdon died at the motion
to dismiss stage.264
Despite these litigation losses, lawsuits can still create indirect
260. Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, supra note 36, at 487 (“Public interest litigators and
organizations have come to view litigation as a vehicle for attracting the media. . . . Often,
litigation attracts the media’s attention in a way that nothing else does.”) (internal citation
omitted); see also MCADAMS, supra note 34, at 194 (noting that the media is more likely to cover
a press release if a lawsuit has been filed because lawsuits are more costly than regular press
releases).
261. Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, supra note 36, at 488.
262. Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
263. Class Action Complaint at 1, Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (No. 4:15-cv-04450-RS).
264. Order Granting Mars Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss, Hodsdon, 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (No. 4:15cv-04450-RS) at 16; see also Dana v. Hershey Co., 180 F. Supp. 3d 652, 654 (N.D. Cal. 2016)
(dismissing claims alleging that Hershey failed to disclose on the packaging of its chocolate
products that their production involved the use of slave labor and the worst forms of child labor);
McCoy v. Nestle USA, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 954, 972 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (dismissing claims alleging
that Nestle failed to disclose on the packaging of its chocolate products that their production
involved the use of slave labor and the worst forms of child labor); Wirth v. Mars Inc., No. 8:15cv-01470 (KESx), 2016 WL 471234, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016) (dismissing claims alleging that
Mars failed to disclose the likely use of forced labor in the supply chain of its pet food products
on their packaging).
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incentives for these corporations to change. First, lawsuits aggregate
sources of facts and norms for public audiences. Obscure industry
codes of conduct, multistakeholder initiatives, government reports,
and company initiatives are brought into view when put under the
spotlight provided by a legal complaint. In Hodsdon, for example, the
class action complaint aggregated facts on child labor in cocoa supply
chains from reports prepared by international organizations
(International Labor Organization), domestic agencies (Department
of Labor), media agencies (CNN), universities (Tulane University),
and NGOs (Fair Labor Association).265 It also aggregated norms that
bind Mars, but which may be unknown to the average consumer, such
as Mars’s commitments under its own code of conduct and human
rights policy, the Harkins-Engel Protocol, or the UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights.266 These embedded sources
of norms provide additional measuring sticks with which stakeholders
can evaluate Mars’s behavior and the behavior of other actors in the
industry, who may similarly be bound to these norms.
Lawsuits not only aggregate information but also elevate it.
Information is packaged within a particular source: a news article,
Twitter post, law review article, judicial opinion, government press
release, or international convention. Each of these sources has
particular normative significance, which may vary depending on which
stakeholder is receiving that information.
Legal materials also have their own normative significance.
Judicial opinions may be especially normatively significant, but
complaints also communicate normative gravity because they signal
that some segment of the public cared enough about the organization’s
conduct to file a complaint and that the conduct at issue may violate
legal norms, which are a socially significant set of norms. By including
information from other sources, lawsuits do not only aggregate
information but also elevate the normative significance of that
information.267
For example, in Hodsdon, stakeholders learned that Mars’s
commitment to eradicate human rights originates from multiple
sources, including UN guidelines, industry association commitments,

265. Class Action Complaint, supra note 263, at 2–3, 11–13.
266. Id. at 8.
267. HANDLER, supra note 36, at 217 (explaining how framing a political struggle in terms of
legal entitlements accords greater legitimacy and validates the values championed).
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and its own corporate policies.268 The average consumer may attach
little normative significance to the UN’s guidelines, but these were
incorporated into another source that consumers may find more
significant: Mars’s voluntary corporate policies.269 Additionally, these
normative obligations were disseminated within the Hodsdon
complaint—a court document—which may garner more normative
significance among stakeholders.270 In this way, international norms
from a distant international organization are elevated through
corporate policies and industry commitments and into domestic legal
materials that consumers may take more seriously.271
B. Reassessing Failure: Process vs. Outcomes
The analysis of reputational dynamics in this Article illustrates
how the information produced by litigation can encourage recalcitrant
organizations to change their practices. These functions are still
important even if the plaintiff loses the litigation.272 As such, the
litigation process can matter as much as litigation outcomes for
achieving socially desirable goals.
One reason that process matters is that resistance to change also
incurs reputational costs—costs that matter even if the target
organization “wins” the litigation. For example, in 2000, a group of
animal advocacy groups brought a lawsuit against Feld Entertainment
(Feld), parent company of Ringling Brothers and Barnum and Baileys,
regarding the treatment of its elephants. Nine years later the case was
dismissed, but Feld brought RICO charges against the animal welfare
groups regarding their conduct in the litigation.273 In 2012, Feld settled
with one animal rights group when it agreed to pay approximately $9
million to Feld; two years later, the remaining animal advocacy groups

268. Class Action Complaint, supra note 263, at 8.
269. Id. at 17.
270. Id.
271. The normative significance of different classes of information may vary by cultural
context. A domestic legal court document, especially a judicial opinion, may garner more
normative significance for an American consumer than the UN guidelines, and the opposite may
be true in other countries. Even within the United States, different consumers may disagree about
the normative significance of different sources of information.
272. NeJaime, supra note 36, at 983–88.
273. Press Release, Feld Entm’t, Feld Entertainment, Inc. Victorious in Case Brought by
ASPCA and Other Animal Special Interest Groups (Dec. 30, 2009), https://
www.feldentertainment.com/PressRoom/DisplayPressRelease/39470/ [https://perma.cc/S9QWLWPZ].
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agreed to pay another $16 million to settle with Feld.274 One year later,
however, Feld announced that it would no longer include elephants in
its circus shows.275 This decision soon made the circus financially
unsustainable, leading to Feld’s decision to close it down.276
Examples of the reputational costs of resistance are not limited to
the litigation context. Consider the fate of shareholder proposals and
the information effects produced through that process. Corporate
scholars argue that not only does the information on the vote and
voting outcomes attract media coverage, but that “negative votes
attract even more media coverage and raise questions about the choices
of the corporate decisionmakers.”277
Finally, we see similar dynamics at work in public law-making
processes when private actors publicly resist change. For example, in
2003, the Sub-Commission on the Protection and Promotion of Human
Rights adopted the UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (Norms). These Norms
proposed a global template outlining the obligations that private
industries have to protect human rights. Several industry associations,
such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and
International Organization of Employers (IOE), expended
considerable resources in opposing the Norms and ensuring that it did
not become binding.278 Although the Norms were effectively tabled,
the resistance to the Norms exerted reputational costs on those
industry actors who opposed them.279 According to former Shell VP
274. See Press Release, Feld Entm’t, ASPCA Pays $9.3 Million in Landmark Ringling Bros.
and Barnum & Bailey Circus Settlement (Dec. 28, 2012), https://www.feldentertainment.com/
PressRoom/DisplayPressRelease/62237/ [https://perma.cc/H5W9-9WLR]; Richard Pollock,
Animal Rights Groups That Paid Circus $15.7 Million File Suit Against Insurers Who Cancelled
Them in 2010, WASH. EXAM’R (July 7, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/
animal-rights-groups-that-paid-circus-157-million-file-suit-against-insurers-who-cancelled-themin-2010/article/2550518 [https://perma.cc/7G3Y-3XRF].
275. Richard Pérez-Peña, Elephants to Retire from Ringling Brothers Stage, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/06/us/ringling-brothers-circus-dropping-elephantsfrom-act.html?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cc/ZSR2-XEVR] (reporting factors such as increased
legislation protecting animals, frequent litigation, and constant protests at circus sites).
276. Press Release, Feld Ent., Feld Entertainment Announces Final Performances of
Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus in May 2017 (Jan. 14, 2017), https://
www.feldentertainment.com/PressRoom/DisplayPressRelease/85085/
[https://perma.cc/564DGZZS].
277. Sale, supra note 176, at 1031 (emphasis added).
278. UN Observer & International Report, Shell Leads International Business Campaign,
GLOBAL POL’Y F. (Mar. 15, 2004), https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/225/
32247.html [https://perma.cc/S6RM-EJSB].
279. Parella, supra note 97, at 132.
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Robin Aram, “This episode . . . has not been without damage to
business. It has linked business with a perception of hostility to human
rights.”280
In each of these examples, the legal process “failed” those seeking
organizational change—the case was dismissed, the vote failed, and the
transnational instrument was suspended. But the legal process itself
forced the organizational actors to react, and they did so by resisting.
That resistance attracted attention to the cause, its champions, and its
opponents. It is this attention, and its subsequent information effects,
that make process and its associated information effects productive
independent of the fate of the litigation, investigation, or other legal
process.
This begs the question: what does it mean to fail? These
reputational dynamics suggest that those evaluating litigation
strategies, government investigations, or even treaty-making should
consider the spillover information effects of these processes when
deciding whether these institutions succeeded or failed.281 These
spillover effects can be unpredictable, distant, and even hard to
identify, but they also form part of the picture and should be included
in analyses of the effects and overall merits of different governance
strategies.282
C. Facilitating Pivoting: How Litigation Enhances the Bonds of
Nonbinding Law
Reputational dynamics also demonstrate how lawsuits can drive
organizations to bind themselves to nonbinding law when they might
otherwise not. There are a variety of nonbinding-multistakeholder
initiatives, international organization recommendations and
guidelines, NGO certifications, and other “soft law” instruments that
seek to regulate businesses’ behavior.283 What these instruments lack is

280. Emily Rabin, In the Hot Seat: Shell VP Robin Aram, GREEN BIZ (June 21, 2004, 5:00
PM), https://www.greenbiz.com/news/2004/06/21/hot-seat-shell-vp-robin-aram [https://perma.cc/
M5HR-RTQ5].
281. Kishanthi Parella, Treaty Penumbras, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 275, 317–22 (2017) (discussing
the spillover effects of international law-making on voluntary industry cooperation with
nonbinding norms).
282. Id.
283. See, e.g., OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES passim
(2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KAU-355N]; JOHN
RUGGIE, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTING THE
UNITED NATIONS “PROTECT, RESPECT, AND REMEDY” FRAMEWORK passim (2011).
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enforcement: they are nonbinding, so corporations are under no
obligation to adopt them. But because they are formulated under the
auspices of reputable organizations, they do possess perceived
legitimacy.
Here, “reputable” may be relative. Many nonbinding guidelines
are developed by various divisions of the UN. The UN’s reputation is
usually superior to that of large corporations routinely criticized for a
range of violations. It is that reputational, or legitimacy, differential
that matters for organizational change. Corporate actors will gravitate
toward legitimacy-enhancing organizations when their own legitimacy
is at stake.284 They pivot toward the UN or NGO actors when they
might not otherwise. They seek to publicly associate themselves with
these more legitimate organizations by forging some form of
institutional relationship with them; these relationships can then foster
change.
For example, DOJ’s criminal investigation caused a legitimacy
crisis for FIFA that encouraged the latter to adopt a victim narrative
through which it presented itself as the victim of its own corruption.285
In order to retain this image—particularly to a doubtful global
audience—FIFA had to take action consistent with its image as the
victim and not the culprit.286 Specifically, FIFA’s legitimacy crisis
meant that it had to distance itself from actors and practices that
compromised its fragile legitimacy, and instead had to move toward
actors and practices that would enhance its legitimacy. This led FIFA
to pivot toward the UN and begin the process of internalizing the UN’s
human rights standards.287 FIFA may not have pivoted toward the UN
on its own, but its legitimacy crisis made association with a more
legitimate organizational partner attractive.
284. Deegan, supra note 95, at 293.
285. See Letter from William A. Burck, Jenny A. Durkan, Thomas Werlen & Stephen M.
Hauss, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, to Lisa Foster, Victim-Witness Coordinator,
U.S. Attorney’s Office, E. Dist. N.Y. (Mar. 15, 2016), http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/
affederation/footballgovernance/02/77/05/70/fifarestitutioncoverletter_neutral.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/UR4A-84WK] (“[FIFA] is a victim of the wrongful acts of multiple defendants in the
above referenced matter . . . .”).
286. According to the FIFA Reform Committee:
[I]n order to restore confidence in FIFA, significant modifications to its institutional
structure and operational processes are necessary to prevent corruption, fraud, selfdealing and to make the organisation more transparent and accountable. Recent events
in particular have damaged FIFA and essential changes to its culture are needed to
effect lasting reform and to restore its reputation . . . .
FIFA, supra note 120, at 1; see Parella, supra note 97, at 133.
287. See notes 138–40 and accompanying text.

PARELLA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

REPUTATIONAL REGULATION

2/5/2018 11:31 PM

971

From the case illustrations examined, organizations are more
likely to pivot under two conditions: first, when the stakes for
legitimacy are high, and second, when they are in need of legitimacy.
The first condition is satisfied, for example, in situations of heightened
regulatory risk. Organizational legitimacy is particularly important
when there is some nascent regulatory threat on the horizon. This
regulatory threat could be prosecutorial, as in the FIFA example, or
governance, like the Paris Climate Accord.288
The second condition can be satisfied by lawsuits, for example,
that can compromise organizations’ public image, removing their
legitimacy just when they need it most. And because of the media
attention given to legal proceedings, lawsuits also help keep public
attention on organizations who are parties to the litigation. These
legitimacy-depriving consequences of litigation further drive
defendant organizations to seek the association of organizations with
greater legitimacy than themselves and borrow institutional practices
from those organizations in order to appear more legitimate.289
D. Shaming the Angels: The Reputational Regulation of
Nongovernmental and Governmental Actors
For a number of reasons, it is important to consider how
reputational sanctions influence the behavior of actors besides business
organizations. First, other types of organizations may take actions that
we do not like, and we may therefore want to encourage them to
change their practices through reputational sanctions. Second, by
sanctioning these actors, we increase the likelihood that they will
sanction another type of organization. For example, reputational
sanctions levelled at public actors like regulators can influence their
willingness to adopt measures against business organizations—
measures that may then trigger a sequence of reputational sanctions
discussed above.290 Finally, reputational sanctions may impact
288. See notes 120–21, 201–04 and accompanying text.
289. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 100, at 68–70; see Kenneth W. Abbott, Orchestration:
Strategic Ordering in Polycentric Climate Governance 9–11 (Working Paper) (describing
“orchestration” as a process by which intergovernmental organizations work with intermediaries
to exercise governance functions). These dynamics are particularly significant in the transnational
sphere, where legal institutions are routinely criticized for lack of enforcement capacity. However,
these lessons are not limited to the transnational context and are also relevant for other situations
characterized by an “enforcement gap.”
290. It is worth noting that reputational regulation does not get off the ground without public
action in the first instance. Each of the case studies examined in Part II began with an act by a
public institution—a court filing, government investigation, or multilateral treaty process—that
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regulators or NGOs differently than business organizations. It is one
thing to shame Exxon Mobil or Walmart—these actors routinely
confront criticism and bad press. It is a different matter when
reputational sanctions attach to one of the “good guys,” such as an
NGO whose mission and identity is dependent upon its reputation for
positive social impact. We need to assess the nature and extent of the
effects of reputational sanctions on these actors so that their use still
leads to socially desirable outcomes.
For example, Survival International, an NGO, filed a complaint
against World Wildlife Fund (WWF), the largest conservation NGO in
the world. Survival International complained about WWF’s financial
and logistical support for the creation of conservation areas in
Cameroon, which were created without the free prior and informed
consent of the Baka, a local indigenous population, in violation of their
human rights, and for the subsequent “violent abuse to which Baka
have been subjected by the ecoguards and other law enforcement
officials who patrol” the conservation areas.291 Survival International
requested a number of organizational changes to WWF’s practices,
including capacity-building, independent consultants, and greater
participation by the Baka.292
Survival International did not bring these claims to a court or
agency but to the Organization for Economic Cooperation &
Development (OECD), an intergovernmental organization that serves
as a forum for economic development issues. The OECD created
nonbinding principles and standards known as the OECD Guidelines
on Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) that apply to MNEs associated
with an adhering country.293 Survival International claimed that WWF
breached these Guidelines through its actions; Survival International
therefore instigated the investigation and dispute resolution process
available under the OECD framework.294
released information into the public space and created the conditions for reputational regulation.
As a descriptive matter, reputational regulation shares the same root as public regulation because
both strategies depend on predicate action by public institutions; reputational regulation is
therefore dependent upon public action.
291. SURVIVAL INT’L CHARITABLE TR., COMPLAINT AGAINST WORLD WIDE FUND FOR
NATURE 5 (2016), http://assets.survivalinternational.org/documents/1527/survival-internation-vwwf-oecd-specific-instance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DM7R-CGN5]
[hereinafter
SPECIFIC
INSTANCE].
292. Id. at 32–34.
293. OECD, supra note 283, at 3.
294. Under the OECD framework, complainants raise their claims with the relevant National
Contact Point (NCP), which in this case is the Swiss NCP because WWF’s headquarters are in
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The complaint and ensuing investigation into WWF gained
international attention because it is a rare occasion in which an NGO
is under investigation for violating the OECD Guidelines.
Traditionally, the “bad actors” under investigation are multinational
businesses.295 It is also the first time in OECD history that one NGO
brought a case against another NGO.296
The complaint brings WWF practices and their human rights
impact to light. It informs the public about the potential consequences
of pursuing one social good (conservation) to the detriment of another
(respect for local indigenous rights). The reputational consequences
for WWF are both familiar and unique. As explored in Part II.A, WWF
may experience financial ramifications for its practices: WWF obtains
a significant portion of its operational revenue from donors, who may
withhold financial support if they believe that WWF is not a good
steward of those funds. This case may also demonstrate competitive
dynamics that we are more accustomed to witnessing in the
marketplace. By discrediting WWF, Survival International raises its
own profile and may even benefit from disgruntled donors who
abandon WWF, perhaps in favor of Survival International (switching
NGOs).297 The complaint also raises the profile of indigenous
populations and land rights issues, which may not receive the same
attention as conservation efforts.298 The complaint could thus
encourage stakeholders to switch their support from conservation
groups to indigenous rights advocacy, whether through Survival
International or another NGO, depending on the elasticity of their
social preferences (switching causes).

Switzerland and Cameroon does not have an NCP. SPECIFIC INSTANCE, supra note 291, at 2.
Under the Guidelines, adhering countries create an NCP to help implement the Guidelines and
resolve any disputes regarding an organization’s failure to abide by the Guidelines. About
National Contact Points, OECD, http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/ncps/ [https://perma.cc/E39AMRCA].
295. Associated Press, Swiss Wade into Complaint Against WWF over Tribe’s Rights, FOX
NEWS (Jan. 5, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/01/05/swiss-wade-into-complaintagainst-wwf-over-tribe-rights.html [https://perma.cc/F88G-PHTT].
296. Survival International vs. WWF, OECD WATCH, http://www.oecdwatch.org/cases/
Case_457 [https://perma.cc/P45V-HCWU].
297. See HANDLER, supra note 36, at 216 (“Through the drama and newsworthiness of the
litigation, the groups and the law reformers publicize their cause and demonstrate their worth,
and thereby hope to stimulate conscience beneficiaries (foundations, unions, and liberals) to
support their cause.”).
298. See id. at 217–18 (explaining that reform groups legitimate their goals and causes through
framing their objectives in the discourse of rights, which can also aid groups in securing resources
from donors).
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But reputational sanctions may have greater impact on an NGO
compared to the business organizations examined in Part II. In
addition to reduced funds, a discredited NGO may suffer damage to its
key strategic resource: its moral authority. This is the resource that
enables it to pursue its mission through partnerships with other
organizations, advocate for causes or groups, disseminate information,
coordinate action, and highlight poor behavior by other organizations.
All of these functions could be jeopardized by too much damage to its
moral authority. These consequences distinguish the unique
vulnerabilities of NGOs to reputational effects. Instead of catalyzing
change, these sanctions could threaten the future viability of the
organization, which is an undesirable outcome if these organizations,
on balance, create a positive social impact. We want them to change,
not to disappear. It is therefore worth exploring the types and the
strength of reputational sanctions that are appropriate for NGOs as
opposed to business organizations.299
In addition to considering how reputational regulation works on
NGOs, it is also worth exploring the reputational regulation of other
actors. The reputational dynamics explained in this Article depend on
a number of legal institutions, such as government investigations and
civil lawsuits that, in turn, depend on the actions of public actors, such
as prosecutors and regulators. These actors are not immune to
reputational consequences; instead, reputational considerations may
influence their own actions as well.
As demonstrated by the case illustrations in Part II, “[r]egulators
are among the key mediators of industries’ and individual firms’
reputations.”300 But regulators also have their own reputations to
manage. A regulator’s reputation is based on “externally held beliefs
regarding an agency’s efficacy in pursuing its formal and informal
mandate, its technical expertise, and the legitimacy of its aims and the
means it employs.”301 Like the corporations they regulate, regulators
are also vulnerable to reputation risk; the way they respond to these
reputational risks impacts, in turn, the reputational sanctions they
create for corporate actors.302
299. This Article does not explore this issue but merely posits the possibility that reputational
sanctions must be calibrated differently when levied against NGOs.
300. Sharon Gilad & Tamar Yogev, How Reputation Regulates Regulators: Illustrations from
the Regulation of Retail Finance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION,
supra note 63, at 320, 321.
301. Id. at 322.
302. Id. at 321.
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For example, institutional factors not only constrained FIFA’s
choices but also influenced the choices made by the government
authorities pursuing FIFA. Specifically, jurisdictional competition
between different criminal enforcement bodies kept the pressure on
FIFA,303 but that external institutional pressure on FIFA was itself a
product of interaction between different organizations, each vying for
status and recognition.304 Their desire to do so is itself a product of
where they stand in relation to each other and in relation to other
government bodies on their home turf.305
E. Toward Information Environments: Extending Reputational
Regulation to Other Legal Institutions
It is not only litigation that produces reputational consequences
for organizational actors. International law-making processes also have
reputational effects for industry actors by raising the profile of policy

303. According to ESPN, the U.S. Attorney’s office for the Eastern District of New York’s
(EDNY) head of the organized crime unit, John Buretta, was eager to raise the profile of EDNY,
and the FIFA investigation offered an opportunity for EDNY to come out from under the shadow
of the high-profile Southern District of New York. Shaun Assael, Brett Forrest & Vivek
Chaudhary, The FBI vs. FIFA, ESPN MAG. (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.espn.com/
espn/feature/story/_/id/14767250/the-exclusive-story-how-feds-took-fifa
[https://perma.cc/ UN
4H-PT73]. Additionally, Swiss authorities aided the U.S. criminal investigation into FIFA by
arresting and extraditing individuals charged by U.S. authorities. Press Ass’n, Swiss Authorities
Agree To Extradite Venezuelan Fifa Official to USA, GUARDIAN (Sept. 23, 2015, 10:36 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/sep/23/swiss-authorities-approve-extradiction-usafifa-official-rafael-esquivel-football [https://perma.cc/93XC-7PU6]. However, “Swiss authorities
have been wary of appearing as puppets of the United States . . . .” Rebecca R. Ruiz, In FIFA
Inquiry, Switzerland Aids U.S. but Is Wary of Being Eclipsed, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/06/sports/soccer/in-fifa-inquiry-switzerland-aids-us-but-iswary-of-being-eclipsed.html [https://perma.cc/CP4C-UEDF]. It is therefore no surprise that Swiss
authorities conducted their own investigation of FIFA: “Switzerland’s privacy laws have stoked a
behind-the-scenes competition, keeping potential key evidence out of the immediate reach of
American prosecutors at the same time that Swiss prosecutors have trumpeted their own
independent criminal inquiry into global soccer’s top leadership.” Id. (explaining that
Switzerland’s attorney-general, Michael Lauber, observed the reputation-enhancing benefits of
the investigation for Loretta Lynch and pursued similar benefits).
304. See Sarah C. Kaczmarek & Abraham L. Newman, The Long Arm of the Law:
Extraterritoriality and the National Implementation of Foreign Bribery Legislation, 65 INT’L ORG.
745, 748 (2011) (“[L]ead regulators from large markets may alter domestic enforcement decision
making in other jurisdictions . . . .”).
305. See Steven Brint & Jerome Karabel, Institutional Origins and Transformations: The Case
of American Community Colleges, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS 63, 348–49 (Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell eds., 1991) (explaining the evolution
of community colleges with reference to the prominence of other players in post-secondary
education).
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issues and informing the public of organizational conduct.306 Critically,
even law-making initiatives that “fail” place certain issues and policy
tools on the table in a way that organizational actors cannot ignore
when developing alternative, often private, governance strategies.307
The information produced by legal institutions also incentivizes
organizational responses in ways other than through reputational
sanctioning. For example, Richard McAdams explains how legal
institutions
serve
coordination
functions
because
“legal
pronouncement can make the prescribed outcome salient or ‘focal,’
thereby creating self-fulfilling expectations that this outcome will
occur.”308 As a consequence, these pronouncements are “likely to
prompt some compliance independent of the threat of legal sanctions,
merely because the common knowledge that everyone heard this
particular message makes the named behavior focal.”309 According to
McAdams, information supplied by legal institutions can be
particularly effective at creating focal points for coordination because
of the publicity accorded legal information, its unique abilities to be
pronounced by public officials and backed by sanctions, and the
reputation of judges and legislators for predicting behavioral change.310
These features of information disclosure by legal institutions suggest
that actors will often respond to that information even if they do not
fear sanctions and are agnostic on the legal institution’s moral
authority.
Additionally, information from legal institutions can encourage
organizational change by altering expectations of the status quo.311
According to behavioral research, “[l]aw can create status quos: when
people are given two options and told that one is the default preferred
by a (domestic) legal regime, participants treat the default rule as the
status quo.”312 Legal institutions create a perception of the status quo
306. Parella, supra note 281, at 317–22.
307. Id. at 301–02 (discussing prospective treaties as “penalty defaults” because “the draft text
already place[s] certain categories of terms on the table [and] [t]his influences the mandate of
topics and issues addressed by voluntary regulation”).
308. Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Testing the Focal Point Theory of Legal
Compliance: The Effect of Third-Party Expression in an Experimental Hawk/Dove Game, 2 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 87, 88 (2005).
309. Id.
310. Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649,
1669–72 (2000).
311. Arden Rowell & Josephine van Zeben, A New Status Quo? The Psychological Impact of
the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, 1 EUR. J. OF RISK REG. 49, 49 (2016).
312. Id. at 50.
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that “identifies an endowment baseline against which subsequent
losses (or gains) will be measured.”313 Critically, this baseline is used to
judge future action, so that failure to achieve the status quo is perceived
as a loss.314 Fidelity to that baseline (and the psychological impact of
failing to achieve it) offers an alternative mechanism for encouraging
organizations to change their behavior even in the absence of
traditional enforcement mechanisms.315
Reputational sanctions, coordination functions, and baseline
shifting are some of the ways that information from legal institutions
encourage organizational change independent of these institutions’
coercive powers. As such, these functions reveal a broader spectrum of
capabilities possessed by legal institutions to alter organizational
behavior.
These capabilities expand further if we do not view their
informational effects in isolation but as part of a broader institutional
“information environment” in which an organization or a population
of organizations resides.316 The discussion above explains how
information effects are not limited to one type of legal institution.
Instead, a broad range of legal institutions exhibit informationdissemination features, including civil and criminal litigation, agency
action317 and international treaty making. The result is that there are a
range of information-producing institutions that surround an
organizational actor.318
For example, in the business and human rights context, consider
the following institutions that can constitute a transnational
corporation’s immediate information environment: activist litigation in
its home state, criminal investigation in host state, mandatory social
reporting requirements at local and regional levels, international
treaty-making processes, and shareholder proposals regarding human
rights due diligence. Each of these institutions helps to correct the

313. Id. at 51.
314. Id. at 52.
315. Id.
316. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Jessica F. Green & Robert O. Keohane, Organizational
Ecology and Institutional Change in Global Governance, 70 INT’L ORG. 247, passim (2016)
(explaining the concept of “organizational ecology” and the ways that the institutional
environment influences the processes of growth and change for organizational populations).
317. See Cortez, supra note 15, at 1371 (explaining the use of publicity as a sanction);
Gellhorn, supra note 15, at 1420 (discussing the risks of adverse agency publicity); Wu, supra note
15, at 1851 (discussing the informal regulatory function of public threats).
318. Abbott et al., supra note 316, passim; DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 100, at 66–67.
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information asymmetries between the public and organizational actors
regarding the latter’s conduct.
But informational environments, made up of more than one
information-producing legal institution, have the following advantages
over individual informational institutions for encouraging
organizational change: magnitude, variety, and temporal effects. First,
the more institutions, the more information released to the public,
which results in greater attention and higher levels of awareness
regarding organizational conduct, all of which increases pressure for
organizations to respond.
Second, having a larger number of institutions not only increases
the overall pressure for changes but also offers different incentives for
change. The information released by each type of institution has its
own characteristics and therefore could vary in the types of
reputational sanctions or other informational effects produced. For
example, governmental investigation may produce regulatory spillover
effects but other institutions may not. Alternatively, legislative
institutions may encourage coordination effects that investigations do
not normally produce. An expanding range of institutions broadens the
spectrum of incentives offered by an organization’s informational
environment.
Finally, the staggered release of information by institutions can
help address the temporal limitations associated with reputational
shaming. Our memories are short and so is the time horizon for many
media stories. Public condemnation that follows media coverage of
litigation may be swift but also brief. If institutions release information
sequentially, however, media coverage may be more likely to remain
with the story and keep the public’s attention on the organization at
issue. For these reasons, the willingness of organizations to change may
vary based on what its immediate information environment looks like.
CONCLUSION
This Article explores how our adjudicative institutions—litigation,
government investigation, administrative action—create informational
effects that have reputational consequences for organizations. These
consequences provide four types of incentives for organizations to alter
their behavior. Financial incentives convert information about
organizational misconduct into financial consequences for the
misbehaving organization. Spillover incentives occur when the conduct
of one organization compromises the reputation of its peers. Policy
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incentives encourage organizations to change in order to appear more
legitimate during significant policy debates concerning them. Finally,
incumbent organizations use reputational sanctions to delegitimize a
potential competitor in the market, thereby using reputation and social
norms as barriers to entry for new business organizations in a market.
Understanding these reputational incentives has implications for
the objectives that litigants pursue in litigation because the process may
be more important that the outcome. Part of the value of litigation is
its dissemination of information about organizational behavior to the
public, often with the aid of the news media. This analysis reveals how
the informational effects of government investigation can also
precipitate organizational change. These adjudicative institutions
create different types of reputational sanctions that vary by the
organization and the stakeholder evaluating its reputation.
Collectively, these reputational sanctions reinforce each other and
incentivize organizations to change.

